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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Two robbers entered an Alabama restaurant and forced customers and 
employees into a walk-in refrigerator at gunpoint.1 Fortunately, one of the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See J. Neil Schulman, Op-Ed., A Massacre We Didn’t Hear About: Firearms in the 
Hands of Private Citizens Should Play an Important Role in Protection of the Public Safety, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at B7. 
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customers, legally armed with his own pistol, shot the robbers before any 
hostage was injured.2 In New York City, a fifty-six year-old woman in a 
wheelchair was attacked while leaving her apartment.3 She shot her 
attacker, ending the attack, with a loaded gun she was carrying in violation 
of local gun-control laws.4 In Texas, a man drove his pickup truck through 
the glass doors of a crowded Texas restaurant, pulled out two semi-
automatic pistols, and opened fire.5 He continued shooting for ten minutes, 
giving hostages ample time to return fire, especially since his pistol 
jammed many times.6 But, Texas law forbade private citizens from 
carrying firearms out of their homes or businesses, and the restaurant 
forbade employees from carrying firearms at work. Twenty-three innocent 
people died.7 
Gun proponents cite anecdotes like these when arguing for the safety 
benefits of firearms and the need for fewer firearm controls. But gun 
opponents have their own stories. In Henderson, Kentucky, a plastics plant 
worker shot and killed five co-workers before killing himself.8 He became 
upset after his supervisor reprimanded him for using a cell phone and 
failing to wear safety goggles.9 That supervisor lost his life.10 In New 
York, a distraught executive summoned two employees to his office, shot 
them to death, and killed himself with a gun he kept nearby.11  
Amid this debate, many states have enacted laws to protect individuals’ 
rights to store guns in their vehicles while at work.12 These laws13 take 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Id. The protagonist sustained minor injuries from the fire exchange. Id.  
 3. John R. Lott, Jr., Op-Ed., NY Gun Laws & the Granny, N.Y. POST, Sept. 14, 2006, 
available at http://swampman.nypost.com/seven/09142006/postopinion/opedcolumnists/ny_gun_ 
laws__the_granny_opedcolumnists_john_r__lott_jr_.htm. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Schulman, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Bob Driehaus, Worker Kills Five at Plant in Kentucky, Then Himself, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2008, at A20. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Insurance Executive Kills Co-Workers, Self, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Georgia), Sept. 17, 2002, 
at A2. Two semi-automatic handguns were found on the floor, and a third was found elsewhere in 
the office; all three belonged to the gunman. Id. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See CHRIS W. COX, NRA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION, WORKERS PROTECTION LAWS—2006 
(2006), available at http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?id=181&issue=53 (noting 
dueling terminology for these laws); ee also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 
1286–87 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (noting that proponents and opponents use different terms to describe 
these laws), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th 
Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). Proponents call these laws “Workers Protection” laws, while opponents name 
them “Forced Entry” laws. This Article adopts the neutral phrase “guns-at-work” laws, a phrase 
used by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, 
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various forms, but all limit an employer’s ability to prevent employees 
from storing guns in their vehicles on employer property.14  
These laws provide a litmus test for the gun debate. Supporters argue 
that such laws are necessary for employee self-defense since many licensed 
gun owners store their guns in their cars for protection as they commute 
through dangerous neighborhoods.15 According to this position, “[h]ard-
working men and women are not immune from criminals in their 
employers’ parking lots. Nor are they impervious to carjackers, robbers or 
rapists during their commute or as they run errands before or after work.”16 
Employees working the graveyard shift deserve a means of self-defense 
too.17  
Opponents argue these laws instead decrease worker morale and safety 
by increasing the proximity to guns that can too easily turn a disagreement 
deadly.18 If employees have immediate access to guns, they argue, 
supervisors will not feel comfortable disciplining employees for fear of 
violent retaliation.19 Moreover, employees will work in fear that a loose 
cannon may “go postal.”20  
At least two federal district courts have considered the legitimacy of 
state guns-at-work laws.21 One found the state laws preempted by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act),22 which Congress 
enacted to promote worker safety.23 According to that court, the state laws 
create an obstacle to, and conflict with, the Act and therefore cannot 
                                                                                                                     
Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2008).  
 14. See infra Part IV.  
 15. See, e.g., Marion P. Hammer, Op-Ed., Businesses May Not Usurp Constitutional Rights, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 1, 2008, at B3.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1334–35; BRIAN J. SIEBEL, BRADY CTR. TO 
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, FORCED ENTRY: THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION’S CAMPAIGN TO FORCE 
BUSINESSES TO ACCEPT GUNS AT WORK 6–12 (2005), available at 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/forced-entry-report.pdf. 
 19. This concern is not without support when a supervisor loses his life simply for 
disciplining an employee about protecting his eyes with safety goggles. See supra text 
accompanying notes 8–10.  
 20. See SIEBEL, supra note 18, at 6–8, 11–12. 
 21. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (N.D. Fla. 2008); 
ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1296, 1330, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d sub nom. 
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).  
 22. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1296, 1330–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007) 
(holding that the OSH Act preempts Oklahoma’s version of these laws and enjoining enforcement 
insofar as they conflict with the OSH Act), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-
5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) . 
 23. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651.  
4
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stand.24 Another court disagreed, finding an express provision in the Act 
permits states to regulate in this area.25 
This Article discusses whether the OSH Act preempts such laws and 
concludes it does not.26 Part II provides an overview of the law necessary 
                                                                                                                     
 24. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1330–40.  
 25. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. The court did not discuss whether Florida’s law 
creates a conflict with the OSH Act. See id. Instead, the court found § 667(a) of the Act applied to 
expressly prevent preemption. Id  
 The Supreme Court’s first Second Amendment case in nearly seventy years, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, adds more fuel to the debate. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Note, Armed by 
Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV . RTS. L.J. 
167, 170–71 (2008) (noting that, before H ller, the Supreme Court had only made one significant 
statement about the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)). In Heller, 
the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment embodies an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms for self- defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 2801, 2817–18 
(2008) (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right,” and 
“[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). Laws violating this right—for instance, by 
completely banning handguns in homes—may not survive judicial scrutiny. See id. at 2817–18 
(finding handgun ban is unconstitutional and invalid).  
 The scope of Heller is uncertain. Because Heller involved the District of Columbia, id. at 2787–
88, it is not yet settled whether the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller will be 
incorporated to apply against the states. See id. at 2812–13 & n.23; see also Klukowski, supra, at 
189–90 (noting Heller did not consider whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to apply 
against the states). Of course, even if the Second Amendment ultimately applies to the states, it will 
not directly apply to private employers. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &  JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6(a) (4th ed. 2007) (noting that the 
first ten amendments to the Bill of Rights directly apply only to the federal government). 
 Further, in Heller, the Court did not consider the precise issue of carrying a gun at all times. 
Heller is limited to guns in the home for self-defense. 128 S. Ct. at 2817–22. It is not yet clear 
whether the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to store her gun in her car. Though 
Heller does not address guns in vehicles, it suggests the stakes in this debate are high if individuals’ 
constitutional rights potentially hang in the balance. S e generally 128 S. Ct. at 2783. It is also not 
difficult to imagine that courts may quickly extend Heller to vehicles. 
 26. See infra Part V. As states are enacting these statutes, the Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence has perhaps signaled a trend of receptivity toward preemption. See, e g., Chamber of 
Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008) (finding that the National Labor Relations Act 
preempts California law where California law regulates within a zone protected and reserved for 
market freedom); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002–07 (2008) (holding preemption 
clause in Medical Device Amendments of 1976 bars state tort claims challenging safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices that have been pre-approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 998 (2008) (finding federal 
law preempts two provisions of Maine law, which regulate tobacco delivery); Preston v. Ferrer, 128 
S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (holding when parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a 
contract, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another 
forum). Bucking this trend, the Supreme Court held on March 4, 2009, that FDA labeling 
requirements did not preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims in a products-liability case. See 
Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, 2009 WL 529172 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009). It is difficult to extrapolate 
from these preemption cases that do not involve the OSH Act to the issue under consideration here 
because preemption analysis turns primarily on the statute at issue. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &  
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to navigate any preemption problem. Part III analyzes the OSH Act and its 
specific provisions. Part IV examines state guns-at-work laws, reveals 
characteristics that many of these laws share, and addresses lower court 
cases that have considered OSH Act preemption of these laws. Part V 
argues that these laws do not conflict with the OSH Act. Finally, Part VI 
contends that preemption requires promulgation of standards in accordance 
with the OSH Act, and absent standards, states remain free to regulate in 
this arena. This dispute over workers’ safety and gun-owners’ rights must 
be resolved by the executive branch in accordance with the OSH Act, 
rather than by the courts through the doctrine of preemption.27 
II.   PREEMPTION PRIMER  
Though states are independent sovereigns, the United States 
Constitution provides that federal law is supreme and contrary state law 
must yield.28 This federal supremacy creates the backdrop for the doctrine 
of preemption.29 
A.  Important Background Principles to Guide Preemption 
Analysis 
Two important principles guide the analysis to determine whether 
preemption applies. First, congressional intent is of paramount importance. 
Second, courts often apply a presumption against preemption in 
traditionally state-controlled arenas.  
1.  Congressional Intent as Lodestar 
The ultimate task in any preemption analysis is clear: determine 
whether state law is consistent with the structure and purpose of the federal 
law as a whole.30 This inquiry uses the federal law’s objectives and 
policies for guidance.31 Congress enacts federal law, and has the power, 
stemming from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,32 to preempt 
                                                                                                                     
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 27. Despite clear constitutional underpinnings, considerable confusion has emerged over the 
scope and application of preemption and whether certain state laws must yield to federal law. See 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540–41 (2001).  
 28. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.; ROTUNDA &  NOWAK, supra note 26, §12.1. 
 29. See ROTUNDA &  NOWAK, supra note 26, §12.1. 
 30. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion). Part 
II of Gade received only a plurality of the Court. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 91. Unless otherwise 
indicated, citation to Gade is to the majority portions of the opinion. 
 31. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987). 
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state law.33 Congressional intent is therefore the lodestar for determining 
whether state law is preempted.34  
Courts discern this congressional intent from the statutory language and 
overall framework of the federal law.35 “The nature of the power exerted 
by Congress, the object sought to be attained, and the character of the 
obligations imposed by the law, are all important in considering the 
question of whether supreme federal enactments preclude enforcement of 
state laws on the same subject.”36 Courts analyze congressional intent 







                                                                                                                     
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 33. “‘It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its 
own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments.’” Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
427 (1819)); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); English v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990). Both federal statutes and regulations can preempt state law. 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). Even a compelling 
state interest cannot save a preempted state law. G de, 505 U.S. at 108. “[A]ny state law, however 
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, 
must yield.” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 82 (1824)). 
 34. See English, 496 U.S. at 78–79. Congress’ purpose has been termed the “touchstone” of 
the preemption analysis. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Only portions of 
Medtronic garnered a majority of the Court. Unless otherwise indicated, citation is to the majority 
opinion.  
 Whether the federal agency that enforces the federal law believes there is preemption is also 
considered in the analysis. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67–68 (2002); see also 
Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 721 (explaining where Congress has delegated to an agency 
administration of a federal program, and the agency has not suggested interference with federal 
goals, the Court is reluctant to find preemption). But see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861, 884–85 (2000) (cautioning that no formal agency statement of preemptive intent is necessary 
before finding conflict preemption). 
 35. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486.  
 36. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941). 
 37. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  
7
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2.  Presumption Against Preemption 
Particularly in areas of law that states have traditionally controlled,38 
preemption analysis begins with an assumption that the historic police 
powers of the state39 stand undisturbed absent evidence of a clear and 
manifest congressional purpose to supersede them.40 This “presumption 
against pre-emption”41 stems from notions of federalism and respect for 
state sovereignty.42 
The Supreme Court has not always applied this presumption 
consistently.43 Thus, though it clearly exists, it is unclear exactly how the 
presumption applies in practice.44 At a minimum, this presumption should 
provide a moment of pause before a court holds that federal law preempts 
state law enacted pursuant to state police powers, and it should require that 
Congress speak clearly when it intends to preempt in areas traditionally left 
to the states.45 When adjudicating cases involving state-controlled arenas,46 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Crime prevention is one such area. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 
(2000) (“Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied 
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and 
vindication of its victims.”). 
 39. State police powers extend to the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
at 485.  
 40. Id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).  
 41. This presumption applies even where state authority allegedly conflicts with federal 
authority. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2002); see also 
Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 430 n.12 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting argument that presumption 
against preemption should not apply to implied preemption cases). 
 When states regulate in areas with a history of significant federal presence, however, there is no 
presumption against preemption. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). Similarly, 
where a federal agency is acting within its congressionally delegated authority to preempt state law, 
there is no presumption against preemption. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 18. In 
this case, the question is simply whether Congress has conferred the power to preempt on the 
agency. Id. A federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may 
preempt state law. Locke, 529 U.S. at 110. 
 42. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 449; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  
 43. Compare, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 668 (1993) (purporting to 
apply presumption), Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (same), with Norfolk S. RR 
v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (failing to mention or apply presumption), and Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (same). See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort 
Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. 
L.J. 913, 967 (2003–2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence and noting 
that “[d]uring the past decade, the Court has referred to the presumption against preemption in 
some cases and ignored it completely in others”).  
 44. See Ausness, supra note 43, at 972–73 (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent 
treatment of the presumption against preemption). 
 45. Id. at 973 (arguing the presumption should act as a “clear statement rule,” requiring 
Congress to state expressly its intent to preempt, and any statutory ambiguity should militate against 
preemption); cf. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (explaining 
that when Congress intends to alter the balance between the states and federal government by 
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courts should not find for preemption of state law where Congress has not 
clearly communicated that federal law preempts.  
B.  Types of Preemption 
Preemption generally takes two forms: express and implied.47 Implied 
preemption is further subdivided into field and conflict preemption.48 
These categories are not rigidly distinct.49  
1.  Express Preemption 
Express preemption is straightforward.50 It exists where Congress has 
shown its intent to preempt state law through explicit statutory language.51 
An express preemption clause generally begins preemption analysis 
because it is the best indicator of Congress’ intent.52 When Congress has 
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the preemption 
task simply gives effect to that language.53 
2.  Implied Preemption 
A federal law lacking an express-preemption provision may still 
preempt state law. Similarly, a federal law with an express-preemption 
provision that does not apply to the state law in question may still preempt 
that law.54 In both cases, this preemption occurs through implied 
                                                                                                                     
preempting the historic powers of states or by legislating in traditionally sensitive areas that affect 
the federalism balance, Congress must make its intentions “unmistakably clear in the language of 
the statute” (citation omitted)). 
 46. See supra notes 38–39. 
 47. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000) (stating that the Court has 
traditionally distinguished between express and implied preemption); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).  
 48. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n.6 (2000) (stating that 
field preemption may fall into the implied-preemption category); Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (noting 
that the Court typically treats conflict preemption as a species of implied preemption); English, 496 
U.S. at 79 (explaining that field and conflict preemption apply in the absence of express statutory 
language).  
 49. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 n.6. For example, a state law that regulates in a preempted field 
may be said to conflict with Congress’ intent. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 104 n.2 (1992) (plurality opinion). Thus, that state law could be considered a species of field or 
conflict preemption. Id.  
 50. See English, 496 U.S. at 78. 
 51. Id. at 79; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002–07 (2008) (interpreting 
the express preemption provision in the Medical Device Act); Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541 
(stating that express language in a congressional enactment may foreclose state action).  
 52. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002).  
 53. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 841 (N.D. 2006). 
 54. See infra note 248. 
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preemption.55 Implied preemption may be either field or conflict 
preemption.56 
a.  Field Preemption 
Congress may intend that federal law “occup[ies] the field” and governs 
the conduct exclusively,57 an arrangement called “field preemption.”58 
Field preemption applies when there is a “‘field reserved for federal 
regulation’ and ‘Congress ha[s] left no room for state regulation of these 
matters.’”59 It is inferred where the federal interest is so dominant that it is 
presumed to preclude state laws on the subject.60 Field preemption stems 
from the depth and breadth of the congressional scheme that occupies the 
legislative field,61 and it depends on the intent behind the federal scheme62  
The Supreme Court has limited application of field preemption, 
especially where state law governs health and safety.63 In arenas 
traditionally within the federal government’s purview, like foreign affairs, 
however, the Court is more likely to find field preemption.64  
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); see also English v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). “It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of pre-
emption to say that state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements.” United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000). Rather, “[t]he appropriate inquiry still remains whether the 
purposes and objectives of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish a workable, uniform 
system, are consistent with concurrent state regulation.” Id. 
 58. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372–73; English, 496 U.S. at 79.  
 59. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002) (quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 111).  
 60. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).  
 61. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).  
 62. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714. 
 63. See, e.g., Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69 (declining to find field preemption where statute did 
not require the Coast Guard to promulgate “comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of 
recreational boat safety and design”; nor did statute require Coast Guard to certify acceptability of 
“every” recreational boat within its jurisdiction); see also Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720 
(explaining even a national policy may not remove a regulation from the area of health and safety 
and convert it to one of overriding national concern warranting preemption). 
 The Court is even more reluctant to infer preemption simply from the comprehensiveness of 
agency regulations. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 720. Instead, it has looked for a specific 
statement of preemptive intent. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000). 
This observation is particularly true for health and safety regulation: “Given the presumption that 
state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal 
regulations, [the Court] will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, 
an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.” Hillsborough County, 471 
U.S. at 718 (explaining complex problems will often require intricate and complex congressional 
solutions without Congress intending to preempt the field).  
 64. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719 (explaining that federal interest in foreign 
affairs stems from the Constitution and is “‘intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities 
of the national government’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941))). 
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b.  Conflict Preemption 
Preemption may also occur impliedly through conflict preemption.65 
Conflict preemption exists where it is impossible to comply 
simultaneously with state and federal law, or where state law “‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress.’”66 These types of preemption are “impossibility” 
preemption and “obstacle” preemption, respectively.67 
i.  Impossibility Conflict Preemption 
Impossibility conflict preemption is exactly as it sounds: if it is 
impossible simultaneously to comply with both state and federal law, state 
law yields.68 “For conflict preemption based on impossibility, the question 
is whether [state law] is explicitly inconsistent with the federal law, not 
whether state law interferes with some purpose of the federal law.”69 The 
Supreme Court describes the impossibility as a “physical impossibility.”70 
ii.  Obstacle Conflict Preemption 
Obstacle conflict preemption is less straightforward, and it has created 
much debate.71 In determining whether a state law is a sufficient obstacle, 
courts examine the federal statute as a whole to discern its purpose and 
intended effects.72 “If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 884; Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Pataki, 158 F. Supp. 2d 248, 
253 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 66. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (citation omitted). 
Conflict preemption turns on an actual conflict rather than an express statement of congressional 
intent. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884. Though clear evidence of a conflict is required, no formal 
congressional or agency statement identifying a conflict is necessary. Id. at 884–85.  
 67. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, 
Phoenix Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State 
and Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 951 (2003). 
 68. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. 
 69. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006).  
 70. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion)).  An example of where it would be 
impossible to comply with both federal and state law is if a federal law forbade avocados testing 
more than seven percent oil, but state law forbade any avocados testing less than eight percent oil. 
See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).  
 71. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 67, at 265 (criticizing obstacle preemption as having no 
place as a constitutional law doctrine); Berger, supra note 67, at 951–52 (stating that academic 
battles have raged over obstacle preemption); Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information 
Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 371 (2006) 
(noting that obstacle preemption has been criticized as a default doctrine used when congressional 
intent is unclear). 
 72. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
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accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field else must be 
frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect—the state law 
must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated 
power.”73 Where this happens, state law creates an obstacle to, and 
conflicts with, federal law.74 In the face of such conflict, federal law 
preempts state law.  
C.  Effect of Savings Clauses 
Congress seldom intends to preempt entire fields of state regulation.75 
Indeed, Congress commonly includes a “savings clause” in its legislation.76 
A savings clause is a provision that legitimizes concomitant state 
regulation.77 If a savings clause exists and applies, it may save state law 
from federal preemption.78  
The federal law is therefore the appropriate starting point to determine 
whether Congress has clearly communicated intent to preempt state law.79 
This Article therefore turns to the OSH Act. 
III.   THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 
The OSH Act brought the federal government into an area traditionally 
within the states’ purview.80 Congress enacted the Act to assure “safe and 
healthful working conditions”81 to every man and woman in the nation.82 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. The Court places some weight on an agency’s opinion of whether the state law stands 
as an obstacle. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 68 (2002); Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000). 
 74. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
 75. See ROTUNDA &  NOWAK, supra note 26, § 12.1. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Massachusetts, 493 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that 
savings clauses at issue save state law from preemption); Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 
209 (3d Cir. 2007) (construing savings clause and finding it saves state law from preemption). Bu  
see Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (concluding savings clause does not bar conflict preemption). 
 79. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“Since pre-emption claims turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in 
any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as 
need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs.” (citations omitted)); se  also 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
484–85 (1996).  
 80. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 81. The circuits define “working conditions” slightly differently. Compare Oil, Chem. & 
Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defining 
“working conditions” as the environmental area in which employees customarily go about their 
daily tasks), and Columbia Gas of Penn., Inc. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1980) (same), 
and S. Ry. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 
1976) (same), with S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that 
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The Act effectuates its purpose by imposing important obligations on 
employers.83 Two relevant obligations are compliance with occupational 
health and safety standards promulgated under the Act, and compliance 
with the Act’s general duty clause.84 Though the Act imposes important 
duties, it simultaneously recognizes that ensuring worker safety is not 
solely a job for the federal government, and it provides for a system of 
cooperative federalism.85 
A.  Employer Obligations: Standards and the General Duty 
Clause 
The OSH Act imposes two primary obligations on employers relevant 
to the guns-at-work debate. First, it requires employers to comply with the 
occupational health and safety standards promulgated pursuant to the 
statute.86 Second, it imposes on every employer a general duty to “furnish 
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which 
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm to his employees.”87 This second obligation, 
known as the “general duty clause,”88 creates an independent, mandatory 
                                                                                                                     
“working conditions” embraces both surroundings, such as the problem of toxic liquid use, and 
physical hazards, “which can be expressed as a location (maintenance shop), a category 
(machinery), or a specific item (furnace)”). These definitions are actually similar in substance. See, 
e.g., Am. Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 448 (explaining that the aggregate of hazards and surroundings 
undergirds the definition of “working conditions” as the environmental area in which employees 
customarily perform their daily tasks). The Secretary of Labor has maintained that “working 
conditions” includes both the environment and discrete hazards of the job. See Herman v. 
Tidewater Pac., Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b); see also Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 501 F.2d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The [OSH] Act’s general purpose and 
its ‘general duty’ clause evidence a clear Congressional purpose to provide employees a safe and 
nonhazardous environment in which business, including commercial and industrial, operations, is 
to be conducted.” (footnote omitted)). 
 83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 654(a). 
 84. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 85. “[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce 
Clause, [the Supreme Court has] recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of 
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal 
regulation.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). This has been termed 
cooperative federalism. Id.; see infra Part III.B. 
 86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 654(a)(2). 
 87. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). “Congress conceived of occupational hazards in terms of 
processes and materials which cause injury or disease by operating directly upon employees as they 
engage in work or work-related activities.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of 
the hazards contemplated are air pollutants, industrial poisons, combustibles, explosives, unsafe 
work practices, and inadequate training. Id. 
 88. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1980) (characterizing § 654(a)(1) as 
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requirement for employers distinct from any specific health and safety 
standards.89 Even if no specific standards exist, employers may still face 
liability for a general-duty-clause violation.90  
1.  Promulgating Standards 
The OSH Act sets forth an intricate scheme for promulgating 
standards.91 This process includes a conference with an advisory 
committee, publication of the proposed rule with a set period of time for 
notice, comments, objections, and an opportunity for hearing.92 Only after 
the procedures are satisfied may the Secretary of Labor issue a rule 
promulgating, modifying, or revoking a standard.93 This produces 
informed decision-making by involving all interested parties in developing 
fair standards, and it provides employers with advanced notice of conduct 
the government considers safe as well as conduct that will result in 
citation.94 The spirit of the Act is to regulate employer conduct through this 
predictable system, rather than by ad hoc decision-making.95 Though the 
                                                                                                                     
the OSH Act’s general duty clause).  
 89. Marshall, 445 U.S. at 12–13; see also Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Therefore, the plain language of the 
statute and its structure indicate that an employer’s duty to provide a safe working environment 
extends beyond compliance with specific safety and health standards that are included in 
regulations promulgated under the act.”); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement 
Workers of Am. v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Section 
5(a)(1) clearly and unambiguously imposes on an employer a general duty to provide for the safety 
of his employees that is distinct and separate from the employer's duty, under section 5(a)(2), to 
comply with administrative safety standards promulgated under section 6 of the Act.”).  
 90. See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.9 (7th Cir. 1975); see 
also 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(c) (providing liability for violations of § 654, which encompasses the 
general duty clause, or for violations of any standard promulgated under § 655); In re 
Establishment Inspection of the Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994). 
Civil penalties for “serious violation[s]” are mandatory. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(b). An employer may 
receive enhanced fines of up to $70,000 for willful violations of the general duty clause. See id. 
§ 666(a). A willful violation may occur the first time an employer violates the general duty clause. 
See Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1419, 1422–
23 (D.C. Cir. 1983). All that is required for liability is that an employer demonstrates plain 
indifference towards the safety requirements of the general duty clause. Id.  
 91. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). 
 92. Id. § 655(b)(1)–(3). 
 93. Id. § 655(b)(4). 
 94. See Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 501 
F.2d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 95. See S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 5186 (1970) (“The general duty clause in this bill would not 
be a general substitute for reliance on standards, but would simply enable the Secretary to insure the 
protection of employees who are working under special circumstances for which no standard has 
yet been adopted.”); Am. Smelting & Refining, 501 F.2d at 511–12 (noting a similar argument made 
in dissent by Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission). The 
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OSH Act requires employers to comply with both specific standards and 
the general duty clause, the general duty clause cannot substitute for 
appropriate standards. No federal standards have been promulgated to 
address guns in vehicles at the workplace.96  
2.  The General Duty Clause 
The general duty clause traditionally addresses hazards arising from 
some condition inherent in the workplace environment.97 The standards for 
establishing a general-duty-clause violation are “exacting.”98 The Secretary 
must prove that (1) the employer failed to render his workplace free of a 
hazard, which was recognized99 as a hazard either by the employer100 or 
generally within the industry;101 (2) the hazard caused or was likely to 
cause death or serious bodily harm; and, (3) feasible102 means existed to 
eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.103  
                                                                                                                     
American Smelting court ultimately declined to adopt the chairman’s opinion as applied in this 
case, explaining that “the general duty clause should be available at least under the facts of this case 
in which a specific standard was under review and in which the Petitioner was allegedly violating a 
health standard that had been recognized nationally for many years;” but it found the chairman’s 
position generally sound. Id. at 512. 
 96. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 97. Megawest Fin., Inc., Dec. & Orders Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n No. 93-2879, 
1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *24 (May 8, 1995). Some courts have found employers owe this 
general duty regardless of whether the employer controls the workplace, is responsible for the 
hazard, or has the best opportunity to abate it. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 
799, 804 (6th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (“This duty is considered general because it asks employers to protect employees from 
all kinds of serious hazards, regardless of the source.”); Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting 
that employer has duty to prevent hazardous conduct by employees); cf. Brennan v. Butler Lime & 
Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[I]f an employee is negligent or creates a 
violation of a safety standard, that does not necessarily prevent the employer from being held 
responsible for the violation.”). At least one court has found the general duty clause does not apply 
to a policy, though it applies to a physical condition of the workplace. Se  Oil, Chem. & Atomic 
Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 98. Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660 
F.2d 439, 444 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 99. A “recognized” hazard is one that is known as a hazard within the particular industry. 
Nat’l Realty & Constr., 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32. Unpreventable instances of hazardous conduct are 
not “recognized.” Id. at 1266.  
 100. Proof of an employer’s actual knowledge of a hazard is sufficient to prove it was 
“recognized,” but the Secretary has the burden of showing the employer’s safety precautions were 
unacceptable in the industry. Magma Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 376–77 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
 101. See Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Sec’y of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 102. “Feasible” means capable of being done, executed, or effected. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., 
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1981).  
 103. See Fabi Const. Co., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
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The general duty clause does not impose on employers an absolute duty 
to make the work environment safe.104 Courts hold that employers do not 
face liability under the general duty clause unless abatement of the hazard 
was possible.105 The government bears the burden of specifying the 
particular steps an employer must take to avoid a citation for violating the 
general duty clause.106 The government must also demonstrate the 
feasibility and likely utility of alternative measures.107  
Courts consistently hold that because the general duty clause is a tool of 
last resort, standards are the preferred enforcement mechanism.108 If a 
specific hazard is a concern, a standard should address it, rather than 
relying on the general duty clause.109  
                                                                                                                     
Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 
2004); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1975). “In 
other words, ‘the Secretary must prove that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the 
circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard in the manner specified by 
the Secretary's citation.’” Fabi Const., 508 F.3d at 1081 (quoting L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 698 F.2d 507, 513 (D.C. Cir.1983)). 
 104. Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660 
F.2d 439, 446–47 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 
1160 (3d Cir. 1992) (collecting and citing supporting cases).  
 105. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804 n.7 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that 
duty must be capable of achievement); see also Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265–66 & n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting Congress did 
not intend the general duty clause to impose strict liability; rather the duty was to be an obligation 
capable of achievement). 
 106. See Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
601 F.2d 717, 724 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 107. See id.; see also Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., 489 F.2d at 1267–68. 
 108. See Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1199 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases 
in support). 
 109. See R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 620 
F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm’n, 501 F.2d 504, 511–12 (8th Cir. 1974); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 
5186 (1970) (“The general duty clause in this bill would not be a general substitute for reliance on 
standards, but would simply enable the Secretary to insure the protection of employees who are 
working under special circumstances for which no standard has yet been adopted.”). But see 
Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that the Secretary did 
not abuse his discretion by proceeding under the general duty clause rather than establishing 
standards).  
 R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. should not be read too broadly because it really just illustrates the 
need to satisfy the general duty clause requirements before enforcing it. In that case, the Secretary 
sought to hold an employer liable under the general duty clause for a hazard that was not 
recognized in the industry. R.L. Sanders, 620 F.2d at 101. The court emphasized that where the 
government seeks to hold an employer to a stricter standard of safety than customary industry 
practice, it must do so through a standard. Id. Thus, the court is essentially finding one of the 
elements of the general duty clause (recognized hazard) lacking, which is its basis for declining to 
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B.  Cooperative Federalism Under the OSH Act 
The OSH Act provides a balance for state and federal control over 
occupational health and safety. While granting the federal government 
wide latitude to establish national standards where necessary, the Act 
simultaneously encourages states to assume full responsibility for the 
administration and enforcement of their occupational health and safety 
laws.110 In this respect, the OSH Act embodies cooperative federalism.111 
The Act accomplishes this balance in § 667.112 Section 667(a) provides 
that nothing in the Act shall prevent any state agency or court from 
asserting jurisdiction under state law over anyoccupational safety or health 
issue where no federal standard is in effect.113 Therefore, where no federal 
standard is in place, states may freely regulate over any given occupational 
health or safety issue.114  
Even where federal standards are in place, states are still not foreclosed 
from regulating.115 Where federal standards exist, § 667(b) permits a state 
                                                                                                                     
enforce the general duty clause. See id. 
 110. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (2006). 
 111. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (providing that the OSH 
Act is a program of cooperative federalism); see also Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a 
Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 156–57 & n.80 
(2001) (stating that cooperative federalism is where the federal and state governments share 
regulatory responsibilities and providing that the OSH Act is a statute subject to cooperative 
federalism); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second 
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 
553 (1993) (“OSHA’s preemption provisions uniquely establish a system of cooperative 
federalism.”); Jose L. Fernandez, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation: Occupational Safety and 
Health Act Preemption and State Environmental Regulation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 97 (1994) 
(explaining that through the OSH Act, Congress has contemplated “state participation in achieving 
the legislative goal of safe and healthy workplaces for employees”); Robert L. Fischman, 
Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 188 (2005) 
(noting that the term “cooperative federalism” has been loosely applied to OSHA); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1383 
(2006) (characterizing the OSH Act’s objective as “cooperative federalism”); Alan Van Gelder, 
Comment, Abolishing the Supervisor Exception to the Independent Employee Action Defense in 
Cal-OSHA Cases, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2001) (acknowledging that the OSH Act was 
intended to be an example of cooperative federalism). Where statutes embody cooperative 
federalism, the Supreme Court leaves a range of permissible choices to the states. See Wis. Dep’t of 
Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002).  
 112. See 29 U.S.C. § 667. 
 113. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). The Secretary promulgates standards in accordance with § 655. 
Section 655 dictates that the Secretary shall “by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health 
standard any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he 
determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health 
for specifically designated employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(a).  
 114. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
 115. See id. § 667(b). 
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to submit a plan for the development and enforcement of state standards, 
and if approved, state standards preempt federal law.116 Absent a state 
plan, however, state law is entirely preempted in the face of federal 
standards.117 States may not even supplement federal standards,118 since 
the Supreme Court has rejected concurrent state and federal jurisdiction 
where federal standards exist.119 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. Section 667 sets forth conditions for approval of state plans. See id. § 667(c).  
 117. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 102 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“Looking at the provisions of § 18 as a whole, we conclude that the OSH Act precludes any state 
regulation of an occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a federal standard has 
been established, unless a state plan has been submitted and approved pursuant to § 18(b).”); see 
also id. at 111–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality, but contending that the 
preemption is express, rather than implied).  
 The Gade plurality and concurrence disagreed over how to categorize this preemption. The 
plurality fashioned its holding from implied preemption principles while Justice Kennedy believed 
§ 18(b) expressly preempts state law. Compare Gade, 505 U.S. at 98–99, 104 n.2 (plurality 
opinion), with id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to the plurality, § 18(b) suggests that 
when a federal standard is in effect, non-approved state standards are in conflict with the full 
purposes and objectives of the OSH Act, thus conflict preemption is present. Se  id at 98–99 
(plurality opinion). But see id. at 104 n.2 (acknowledging that the preemption at issue does not fit 
neatly into a category and could just as easily be characterized as field preemption). Justice 
Kennedy believed the express terms of § 18(b) mandated preemption, thus the preemptive scope of 
the OSH Act is limited to the language of the statute. See id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 The Gade plurality dismissed the disagreement as labeling, “implied” versus “express,” which is 
merely technical. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2 (plurality opinion). Though this is generally 
correct, there is also a substantive distinction between the plurality and concurrence. Justice 
Kennedy would limit the scope of the OSH Act to the text of § 18(b), but the plurality is willing to 
look beyond and find implied preemption. Compare id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
pre-emptive scope of the Act is also limited to the language of the statute. When the existence of 
pre-emption is evident from the statutory text, our inquiry must begin and end with the statutory 
framework itself.”), with id. at 98–99, 104 n.2 (plurality opinion). Per Justice Kennedy’s rationale, 
OSH Act preemption is defined by § 18, and if it does not apply, state law is not preempted. See id. 
at 114 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy would not look to implied preemption where an 
express preemption clause exists but does not govern. S e id. at 109–11, 114 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Kennedy’s view has lost. See infra note 250. 
 118. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion). This is from the portion of Gade receiving 
only a plurality; however, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence agrees in substance, making this the 
Court’s holding. See id. at 113 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 119. See id. at 102 (plurality opinion); id. at 114 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Pedraza v. 
Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991) (“At its outer reaches section 18 preemption does not 
obtain unless there is an unapproved assertion of jurisdiction under State law over any occupational 
safety or health issue as to which a federal standard is already in place.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). According to Gade, the design of the OSH Act 
suggests Congress intended only one set of regulations to govern, and a state may only regulate 
OSHA-regulated occupational safety and health issues pursuant to an approved state plan that 
displaces federal standards. Gade, 505 U.S. at 99 (plurality opinion). All state regulations relating 
to an “issue” already addressed by a federal standard are preempted even if they do not conflict with 
the federal scheme. Id. at 98–99; see also Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder the [OSH Act] . . . when OSHA promulgates a federal standard, that 
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C.  The OSH Act’s Savings Clauses 
The OSH Act contains two savings clauses: §§ 4(b)(4) and 18(a).120 
Both provisions are discussed here to determine whether either will save 
state guns-at-work laws from preemption.   
1.  Section 4(b)(4) 
Section 4(b)(4) is entitled in relevant part “workmen’s compensation 
law or common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers 
and employees unaffected.”121 It states that nothing in the OSH Act shall 
be construed to:  
supersede or in any manner affect any workmen’s 
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any 
other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or 
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with 
respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out 
of, or in the course of, employment.122 
                                                                                                                     
standard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state 
occupational safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are 
included in the state plan.”).  
 A state occupational safety and health law is one that directly, substantially, and specifically 
regulates occupational safety and health. Gade, 505 U.S. at 107. According to the Act, an 
“occupational safety and health standard” is “a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption 
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or 
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 652(8). Any state law designed to promote health and safety in the workplace falls within this 
definition, and any state law regulating occupational health and safety is preempted by an OSHA 
standard regulating the same subject matter. S e Gade, 505 U.S. at 105.  
 This is true even if the state law serves several objectives. Se  id. at 106. “That such a law may 
also have a nonoccupational impact does not render it any less of an occupational standard for 
purposes of pre-emption analysis.” Id. at 107. State laws of general applicability, however (such as 
traffic or fire safety laws), that do not conflict with OSHA standards and that regulate conduct of 
workers and non-workers alike are generally not preempted. Id. Stated simply, in the absence of the 
Secretary’s pre-approval of a state plan, “the OSH Act pre-empts all state law that constitutes, in a 
direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety” even if the legislation also 
regulates matters outside of worker health and safety. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If a 
state wants to enact a dual-impact law that regulates an occupational safety or health issue for which 
a federal standard is in effect, it must first submit a plan. Id. at 108. 
 120. Occupational and Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 4(b)(4), 18(a), 
84 Stat. 1590, 1592–93, 1608 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 653(b)(4), 667(a) (2006)); see 
also Gade, 505 U.S. 96–97, 100 (plurality opinion) (explaining that Congress expressly “saved” 
some state law from federal preemption in §§ 4(b)(4) and 18(a) and referring to § 18(a) as a “saving 
clause”); Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 52–53 (terming § 4(b)(4) the Act’s “savings clause”); Associated 
Indus. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing § 18 as a “savings clause”). The 
Pedraza court does not characterize § 18(a) as a “savings clause” but instead describes it as a 
general statement of preemptive intent. See Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 51–52. 
 121. 29 U.S.C. § 653. 
 122. Id. § 653(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
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Sparse legislative history exists for § 4(b)(4).123 The First Circuit 
interpreted it very narrowly, finding “the provision [is] merely to ensure 
that OSHA [is] not read to create a private right of action for injured 
workers which would allow them to bypass the otherwise exclusive 
remedy of worker’s compensation.”124 The Third Circuit disagreed, 
arguing such an interpretation “defies traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation” by ignoring the plain language of § 4(b)(4), which is not 
limited only to workers’ compensation but which precludes other matters 
expressly identified in the statute.125 The D.C. Circuit has also offered its 
own interpretation of § 4(b)(4).126 According to that court, § 4(b)(4) bars 
workers from asserting a private cause of action against employers under 
OSHA127 standards, and when a worker asserts a claim under state 
workmen’s compensation or other law, § 4(b)(4) bars the worker and her 
adversary from asserting that the OSH Act preempts any element of state 
law.128  
2.  Section 18(a) 
The second savings clause, § 18(a) is straightforward. It expressly 
permits states to assert jurisdiction under state law over any occupational 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See Ries v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1234 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 124. See Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 266 (1st Cir. 1985). But see Elliott v. 
S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (questioning the continued validity of Pratico). 
 125. Ries, 960 F.2d at 1161–62; see also Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 209 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“We join with those courts whose holdings have formed a solid consensus that [the 
savings clause] operates to save state tort rules from preemption.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 53 & n.6 (rejecting argument that § 4(b)(4) saves only 
worker’s compensation laws and noting “[t]here is a solid consensus that section 4(b)(4) operates to 
save state tort rules from preemption”). Courts have also found that § 4(b)(4) saves criminal laws, 
see, e.g., People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1990) (finding § 4(b)(4) supports conclusion that 
OSH Act does not preempt state criminal laws), and rights granted by statute, see, .g., Startz v. 
Tom Martin Constr. Co., 823 F. Supp. 501, 505–06 (N.D. Ill. 1993). See also Judy K. Broussard, 
Note, The Criminal Corporation: Is Ohio Prepared for Corporate Criminal Prosecutions for 
Workplace Fatalities?, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135, 154–56 (1997) (contending that the most 
compelling argument against OSH Act preemption of state criminal laws is the language of 
§ 4(b)(4) and citing cases finding no preemption of state criminal laws). See generally Note, 
Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for 
Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1987) (arguing OSH Act does not preempt criminal 
prosecutions). 
 126. See Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1235–36. 
 127. “OSHA is the organization within the Department of Labor that addresses hazards in the 
workplace, including workplace violence.” Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir., Directorate of 
Enforcement Programs, Occupational Health and Safety Admin., to Morgan Melekos (Sept. 13, 
2006), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTER 
PRETATIONS&p_id=25504 (recognizing in a Standard Interpretation letter that no standards 
exist). 
 128. See Marshall, 647 F.2d at 1235–36. 
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health or safety issue where no federal standard is in effect.129 In such 
instances, resolving the preemption inquiry should be simple: federal law 
does not preempt state law. As revealed in Part V.A.2, however, this is not 
necessarily true.  
IV.   GUNS-AT-WORK LAWS 
A number of states—including Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma—have 
already enacted guns-at-work laws, and many more have legislation 
pending.130 These laws are generally similar, but each has nuances. This 
Part highlights the laws in Florida, Georgia, and Oklahoma—important 
jurisdictions in the gun debate that provide examples of guns-at-work 
laws—and it discusses the guns-at-work laws of other states. It also 
identifies noteworthy commonalities of these laws that are relevant to the 
preemption inquiry.131 Finally, it considers two recent federal district court 
                                                                                                                     
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006).  
 130. The states with legislation pending include Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Missouri, 
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. S e H.R. 362, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2009) (providing no employer or 
other person may establish a policy that restricts the right of a person possessing a firearm stored in 
his or her motor vehicle from parking that vehicle in the parking facility while lawfully possessing 
the firearm; violation is a misdemeanor, and the violator may also be subject to civil liability); H.R. 
2536, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008) (providing employer shall not prevent a person from 
transporting, possessing, or storing a gun in a locked motor vehicle parked in employer’s parking 
lot, parking garage, or other parking area); S.B. 11, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009) 
(prohibiting a natural person, corporation, or governmental entity from enforcing a policy or rule 
that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm locked in the individual’s vehicle while the 
vehicle is in or on the person’s property; and authorizing a civil damages action for violations); 
H.B. 170, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (providing that a business owner shall not 
restrict any person from lawfully possessing a firearm in a motor vehicle in possession of such 
person except a motor vehicle owned or leased by such business; providing for a civil cause of 
action); H.R. 1185, 190th Gen. Assem., 2007–08 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (prohibiting employers 
from discharging, threatening, or otherwise discriminating or retaliating against an employee 
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment 
because the employee exercises “self-defense rights,” which include right to carry firearm in 
vehicle, and providing for civil action against violators); H.R. 3063, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess., 
§§ 1, 4 (Tenn. 2007) (providing no person, “including but not limited to an employer,” who is the 
owner, lessee, or occupant of property shall prohibit any person who is legally entitled to possess a 
firearm from possessing it in a vehicle on property, and providing for civil damages against an 
employer who fires, disciplines, demotes, or otherwise punishes an employee for exercising these 
rights); S. 2928, 105th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007) (same). For an older Tennessee 
guns-at-work bill that never left committee, see S. 153, 105th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 
2007). 
 131. This survey does not include every law addressing firearm possession or firearms in 
vehicles. It focuses only on laws that have the effect of preventing private employers from 
prohibiting employees from storing guns in their vehicles while at work—what this Article has 
termed “guns-at-work” laws. 
 Utah, for instance, has a law that is similar to the guns-at-work laws, but it applies only to local 
authorities and state entities. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102(2) (West 2008). It states that unless 
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cases that reached opposite conclusions on the precise question considered 
here: whether the OSH Act preempts guns-at-work laws.  
A.  Guns-At-Work Laws132 
1.  Florida 
Florida’s guns-at-work law133 prohibits employers from preventing 
customers, employees, or invitees from possessing legally owned firearms 
locked in vehicles in parking lots when lawfully in the area.134 Employers 
may not stop these individuals from entering parking lots with firearms in 
their vehicles so long as the firearms are out of sight within the vehicle.135 
Employers may not inquire whether there are firearms in vehicles, nor may 
they conduct searches of vehicles.136 Only on-duty law enforcement may 
conduct vehicle searches.137  
Employers may not take any action against employees, customers, or 
invitees based on statements regarding firearms in vehicles.138 Employers 
also may not condition employment on an agreement not to maintain such 
firearms.139 Nor may they terminate, expel, or otherwise discriminate 
against employees, customers, or invitees for exercising these rights (so 
long as the firearms are never exhibited on company property for any 
reason other than lawful self-defense).140 
Florida’s statute completely immunizes employers from civil liability 
for actions taken in compliance with the statute.141 It also provides that the 
                                                                                                                     
specifically provided by state law, no local authority or state entity may prohibit an individual from 
transporting, or keeping a firearm in any vehicle lawfully in the individual's possession or lawfully 
under the individual's control. Id. § 53-5a-102(2)(a). It does not, however, prevent private 
employers from enacting policies prohibiting weapons in vehicles (as is the case with the guns-at-
work laws discussed herein). See Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 954–56 (Utah 2004) 
(analyzing UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-98-102, which was subsequently renumbered, effective May 5, 
2008, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (2008)).  
 132. Summaries of the guns-at-work laws with noteworthy aspects of each appear in a chart in 
Appendix A. See infra app. A. The chart reveals relevant characteristics of many of the laws that 
may prevent conflict with the OSH Act. See id. 
 133. Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of 
2008, 2008 Fla. Laws ch. 2008-7, 1–5 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West 
2008), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 
2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008)). 
 134. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a). 
 135. Id. § 790.251(4)(d). 
 136. Id. § 790.251(4)(b). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. § 790.251(4)(c)(2). 
 140. Id. § 790.251(4)(e). 
 141. See id. § 790.251(5).  
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statute shall not be interpreted to expand any existing duty or create any 
additional duty for employers.142  
The Florida legislature granted the Florida Attorney General authority 
to enforce the statute.143 Nothing in the statute, however, prevents the 
aggrieved from suing for violations of rights protected by the statute.144 
“[C]ourt[s] shall award all reasonable personal costs and losses suffered,” 
and they “shall award all court costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing 
party.”145 
The statute contains numerous exceptions.146 It does not apply to 
vehicles owned, leased, or rented by employers.147 Nor does it apply to any 
property owned or leased by employers (or landlords of employers) upon 
which possession of firearms is prohibited pursuant to federal law, by 
contract with a federal-government entity, or under the general law of 
Florida.148 
2.  Georgia 
Georgia also enacted a guns-at-work law, but it differs from the 
others.149 Although it does not expressly ban enacting policies prohibiting 
weapons in vehicles, it effectively accomplishes this result.150  
Georgia’s law provides that employers shall not establish, maintain, or 
enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of allowing employers or their 
agents to search locked, privately owned vehicles of employees or invited 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Id. § 790.251(5)(c). The exact meaning of this provision is unclear and seemingly 
paradoxical. The statute clearly creates additional duties for employers. It requires them to permit 
various activities on their property that they otherwise might not, and it prevents them from acting 
when they otherwise might. See id. § 790.251(4). 
 143. Id. § 790.251(6). The Attorney General may commence a civil or administrative action to 
enforce the statute. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. § 790.251(7). 
 147. Id. § 790.251(7)(f). 
 148. Id. § 790.251(7)(g). This provision may be interpreted broadly to prevent conflict with 
the OSH Act. If it were determined that the OSH Act required banning guns from vehicles, and an 
employer did so to adhere to the OSH Act, this exception suggests that Florida’s guns-at-work law 
would not be violated. See id. This result follows because the employer would be acting pursuant to 
its OSH Act obligations. Because, in this scenario, possession of firearms would be prohibited 
pursuant to federal law, the state-law exception would enable employers to prohibit guns. Thus, 
Florida’s guns-at-work law may be interpreted to avoid any OSH Act conflict entirely. 
 149. See Business Security & Employee Privacy Act, 2008 Ga. Laws 802 (codified at GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 (West 2008)). This Act was approved May 14, 2008. Id. The law became 
effective July 1, 2008. See GA. CODE ANN. § 1-3-4(a)(1). Georgia also has a guns-at-work bill 
currently pending before its legislature. See infra note 164. 
 150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135.  
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guests in employer parking lots.151 Employers also may not condition 
employment on any agreement prohibiting prospective employees from 
entering parking lots when their vehicles contain firearms locked in trunks, 
glove boxes, or other enclosed compartments out of sight—provided the 
employee has a Georgia firearms license.152 
Like other guns-at-work laws, Georgia’s statute has many 
exceptions.153 It excepts searches by certified law enforcement officers 
pursuant to valid warrants; searches of vehicles owned or leased by 
employers; “any situation in which a reasonable person would believe that 
accessing a locked vehicle of an employee is necessary to prevent an 
immediate threat to human health, life, or safety;” and searches by licensed 
private security officers (with employee consent) for loss prevention based 
on probable cause that the employee unlawfully possesses employer 
property.154 It does not apply to an employee who is restricted from 
possessing a firearm on the premises due to disciplinary action;155 where 
state law, federal law, or regulation prohibits transport of a firearm on the 
premises;156 and to any area used for parking on a temporary basis.157 A  
do many other states, Georgia limits employer liability stemming from 
compliance.158  
Georgia’s statute contains two interesting provisions. First, it provides 
that an employer’s effort to comply with other applicable federal, state, or 
local safety laws, regulations, guidelines, or ordinances is a complete 
defense to liability.159 Second, it contains a very broad provision that 
highlights the narrowness of the statute’s restrictions.160 It provides that 
nothing in the statute shall restrict rights of private property owners (or 
persons in legal control of property) to control access to their property.161 
Even for employers, private property rights govern.162 Because many 
employers either own or lease the properties where their businesses 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See id. § 16-11-135(a). 
 152. See id. § 16-11-135(b). 
 153. See id. § 16-11-135(c)–(f), (h), (k). 
 154. See id. § 16-11-135(c)(1)–(4). 
 155. See id. § 16-11-135(d)(5). 
 156. Id. § 16-11-135(d)(6). This could be used to argue Georgia’s statute does not conflict 
with the OSH Act. See supra note 148 and accompanying text, and i fra notes 188–90 and 
accompanying text.  
 157. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(8). 
 158. See id. § 16-11-135(e). 
 159. See id. § 16-11-135(f). Perhaps even more so than with Florida’s provision, this provision 
should eliminate any OSH Act conflict because OSH Act compliance should be a complete defense 
to liability under this statute. See id; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text, and i fra 
notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 160. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(k). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
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operate, private property rights appear to completely negate the statute.163  
The Georgia Assembly also has a bill pending that is more similar to 
the other states’ guns-at-work laws.164 It prohibits employers from 
establishing, maintaining, or enforcing any policy or rule that has the effect 
of prohibiting employees from transporting or storing firearms in locked 
vehicles in parking areas.165 It contains the usual exceptions, including if 
state or federal law prohibits the transport of a firearm on the premises.166 
The bill also contains a provision immunizing employers from liability for 
compliance.167  
3.  Oklahoma 
Oklahoma has two guns-at-work laws. First, the Oklahoma Firearms 
Act of 1971 prohibits: 
[Any] person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business 
entity [from] maintain[ing], establish[ing], or enforc[ing] any 
policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, 
except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing 
firearms in a locked motor vehicle, or from transporting and 
storing firearms locked in or locked to a motor vehicle on any 
property set aside for any motor vehicle.168  
Civil action may be brought to enforce this section, and damages, 
attorney’s fees, and court costs may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.169 
The statute immunizes individuals required to permit firearms in vehicles 
from civil action for events arising from such firearms unless the 
individuals commit crimes involving the firearms.170  
                                                                                                                     
 163. This subsection is in clear tension with subsection (b), which prevents employers from 
conditioning employment (in a sense, access to property) upon agreement that prospective 
employees will not enter the parking lot with firearms in vehicles. S e id. § 16-11-135(b). Perhaps 
this means an employer may not condition employment on an agreement not to bring guns, but once 
an employee brings her guns, an employer (who also owns or leases the business property) may 
prevent access to the property. This seems like an illogical result if it is in fact what the Georgia 
legislature intended. 
 164. See S. 43, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007–08). 
 165. See id. § 1(a). 
 166. See id. § 1(b) (excepting also employers who provide secure parking areas restricting 
general access; vehicles owned or leased by employers and used by employees in course of 
business; employees who are restricted from carrying or possessing a firearm due to disciplinary 
actions; and penal institutions and similar places of detention). 
 167. Id. § 1(c). 
 168. See OKLA . STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.7a(A) (West 2008). 
 169. Id. § 1289.7a(C). 
 170. Id. § 1289.7a(B). This subsection does not apply to claims under the Worker’s 
Compensation Act. Id. 
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A second Oklahoma statute, entitled “Business owner’s rights,” grants 
the right to transport and store firearms in locked vehicles on private 
property even when private property owners prefer otherwise.171  
4.  Other States 
Numerous other states have also enacted guns-at-work laws. Many of 
these statutes specifically include employers in the class of persons to 
whom the laws apply. For example, Kansas’s concealed weapons law 
permits employers to restrict the carrying of concealed weapons while on 
business premises, but it prevents employers from prohibiting possession 
of firearms in private vehicles while parked on employer premises.172  
Kentucky has a similar law, which declares that any employer who 
punishes an employee for exercising a right guaranteed by Kentucky’s 
statute will face civil liability.173 Louisiana has a similar law.174 Like many 
of the other states, it contains a clause immunizing those to whom the 
statute applies from damages arising from compliance.175 It also contains 
an exception common to many of these statutes: it does not apply where 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See OKLA . STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1290.22 (West 2008); see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. 
Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d  sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. 
Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). Both §§ 1289.7a and 1290.22 are 
criminal statutes that subject a violator to misdemeanor sanctions or punishment under Oklahoma 
law. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Henry, 110 P.3d 83, 84–86 (Okla. Crim. Appeals 2005). Oklahoma has 
expressly declared the right to transport firearms in vehicles. See OKLA . STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.7 
(“Any person, except a convicted felon, may transport in a motor vehicle a rifle, shotgun or pistol, 
open and unloaded, at any time.” (emphasis added)).  
 172. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11(a)(1) (2008). That provision provides: 
(a) Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent: 
(1) Any public or private employer from restricting or prohibiting by personnel 
policies persons licensed under this act from carrying a concealed weapon while 
on the premises of the employer’s business or while engaged in the duties of the 
person's employment by the employer, except that no employer may prohibit 
possession of a firearm in a private means of conveyance, even if parked on the 
employer's premises[.]  
Id. 
 173. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(1), (4). Kentucky’s Penal Code also contains a guns-at-
work provision. See id. § 527.020. It prevents persons or organizations from prohibiting individuals 
licensed to carry concealed deadly weapons from possessing them in their vehicle. Id. § 527.020(4), 
(8). Any attempt to do so may result in damages or other appropriate relief. Id. Yet another 
provision of Kentucky law addresses guns in vehicles. S e id. § 237.110(17) (preventing private 
employers from prohibiting persons holding weapons licenses from carrying weapons in vehicles).   
 174. See S.B. 51, 34th Reg. Sess. (La. 2008) (codified at LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1 
(2008)).  
 175. Id. § 32:292.1(B). 
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state or federal law prohibits the possession of firearms.176  
Other state guns-at-work statutes do not specifically reference 
employers, but are sufficiently broad to apply to employers.  For example, 
Alaska’s guns-at-work law forbids any person from prohibiting individuals 
from lawfully possessing firearms in vehicles.177 The statute immunizes 
individuals from liability for any injury or damage resulting from 
compliance with the statute.178 Importantly, the statute does not limit rights 
or remedies under other law,179 nor does it apply to individuals who may 
not legally possess a firearm under state or federal law.180  
Minnesota’s guns-at-work law is also broadly worded.181 Part of the 
criminal statutes, it provides that “the owner or operator of a private 
establishment may not prohibit the lawful carry or possession of firearms 
in a parking facility or parking area.”182  
                                                                                                                     
 176. See id. § 32:292.1(D)(1)–(3). This language suggests no OSH-Act conflict. See supra 
note 148. Mississippi’s guns-at-work statute is similar to Louisiana’s. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-
55 (West 2008). Employers will not face civil liability for damages resulting from occurrences 
“involving the transportation, storage, possession or use of a firearm covered by this section.” Id. 
§ 45-9-55(5). The statute does not authorize transportation or storage of firearms on any premises 
where possession is prohibited by state or federal law. Id. § 45-9-55(4). 
 177. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a) (2008). 
 178. Id. § 18.65.800(c).  
 179. Id. § 18.65.800(b). This provision could be interpreted to avoid any OSH Act conflict. If 
the OSH Act grants employees a right to be free from unsafe workplaces with guns in vehicles, 
Alaska’s guns-at-work law presumably would not limit this right by compelling employers to permit 
guns. See id. 
 180. Id. § 18.65.800(a). This too may eliminate conflict with the OSH Act. Section 
18.65.800(a) only applies to firearm possession by individuals who may legally possess them under 
state and federal law. See id. This necessarily means it does not apply to individuals possessing 
firearms unlawfully under state or federal law. See id. If it were unlawful under federal OSH Act to 
possess firearms in vehicles while at work, this exception arguably would apply. In that case, 
employers would argue that the exception is satisfied because employees may not possess firearms 
under federal law (at least while on the employer’s property). It is not clear from the language of the 
exception whether this argument would succeed. It seems more likely that this exception means if 
federal law prevents an individual from possessing a firearm at all, an employer need not permit the 
individual to possess the firearm in her vehicle. If, however, the person is permitted under federal 
and state law to possess a firearm, § 18.65.800(a) seems to require that she be permitted to 
possess/store it in her vehicle. The argument that this provision eliminates an OSH Act conflict is 
plausible, however, and no court has held otherwise. 
 181. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(c) (West 2008), held unconstitutional as applied to 
church parking lots in Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10, 213 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (finding exemption for churches using their property for religious reasons 
and basing decision on religious freedom and not property rights or the OSH Act). 
 182. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(c) (West 2008), held unconstitutional as applied to 
church parking lots in Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10, 213 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (finding exemption for churches using their property for religious reasons 
and basing decision on religious freedom and not property rights or the OSH Act). Minnesota’s law 
contains another provision that addresses employers specifically. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(18). 
It provides that employers and public postsecondary institutions may establish policies restricting 
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B.  Noteworthy Aspects of the Laws 
Although these laws vary, they often have many commonalities. Two 
commonalities are relevant here, and both suggest no conflict with the 
OSH Act. 
First, almost none of the guns-at-work laws target employees 
specifically.183 Though the laws apply to employers, very few of the laws 
protect only employees.184 The majority apply generally to protect the 
public while on property, including business property.185 These are laws 
pursuant to state authority over health, safety, and welfare that generally 
prevent prohibiting guns in vehicles.186 Essentially, state legislatures have 
granted individuals the right to store guns in their vehicles while parked 
and conducting business—whether that business is grocery shopping or 
working.  
As the Supreme Court has explained, however, the critical question for 
preemption is not necessarily a state’s intentions in enacting law but rather 
the state law’s effect on federal law.187 The effect of guns-at-work laws on 
the OSH Act is therefore still important, and is discussed further in Part V.  
Second, and more importantly, the majority of guns-at-work laws have 
exceptions for federal law. Approximately two-thirds of these laws will not 
force individuals to permit firearms if federal law prohibits possessing 
firearms.188 If the OSH Act prevents possessing firearms in workplace 
                                                                                                                     
carrying firearms, but neither may prohibit lawful carrying or possession in parking facilities or 
parking areas. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(18). 
 183. See infra app A. 
 184. See infra app A. 
 185. See infra app A. 
 186. “Parking-lot laws” rather than “guns-at-work laws may therefore be more appropriate. See 
generally Stefanie L. Steines, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on Private-Property Rights and 
Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1171 (2008) (terming such laws “parking-lot laws”).  
 187. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992) (“Whatever the 
purpose or purposes of the state law, pre-emption analysis cannot ignore the effect of the challenged 
state action on the pre-empted field. The key question is thus at what point the state regulation 
sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed pre-empted under the [OSH] 
Act.”). The Gade Court did point out, however, that generally applicable laws that do not conflict 
are generally not preempted, see id. at 107–08, but this does not eliminate the need to determine 
whether there is a conflict. As Part V of this Article shows, there is none. See infra Part V. 
 188. See infra app. A. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a)–(b) (2008) (providing it only applies 
to individuals who may lawfully possess firearms under state or federal law and stating it does not 
limit a person’s rights or remedies under any other law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251(7)(g) (West 
2008), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 
2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (excepting property upon which firearm possession is prohibited 
pursuant to federal law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (West 2008) (permitting a person, 
including an employer, to prevent an individual from possessing a firearm on the property where 
that individual is prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32:292.1(D)(1) (2008) (providing the section shall not apply to any property where possession of 
firearms is prohibited by state or federal law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(4) (West 2008) (stating 
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parking lots because it creates a safety hazard to employees, then these 
state statutes would not force employers to permit them.189 For those guns-
at-work laws that expressly yield to federal law, there can be no conflict 
with federal law.190 In instances where the OSH Act prevents guns in 
vehicles, guns-at-work laws in approximately two-thirds of the states 
appear expressly to yield, leaving only three states with laws potentially 
conflicting with the OSH Act.191  
C.  Cases Analyzing OSH Act Preemption of 
State Guns-at-Work Laws 
Florida and Oklahoma federal district courts have analyzed the state 
guns-at-work laws of those states to determine whether the OSH Act 
preempts them. In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, the Northern District of 
Oklahoma held the OSH Act preempts Oklahoma’s laws.192 In Florida 
                                                                                                                     
this section does not authorize a person to store a firearm on any premises where the possession of 
firearms is prohibited by federal law). But see supra note 180; infra note 189. 
 Georgia’s statute also has an exception for federal law, but it has a different effect than the other 
states’ exceptions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(6) (West 2008) (providing exception where 
transport of firearms on employers’ premises is prohibited by state or federal law). This is because 
Georgia’s guns-at-work law does not directly prevent employers from prohibiting employees from 
storing guns in vehicles. See id. It prevents vehicle searches and conditioning employment on 
agreements not to access firearms stored in vehicles. Se  id. The statute’s exception is from taking 
these actions. See id. § 16-11-135(d). This exception thus permits federal law to trump state 
prohibition on the specific conduct outlined in Georgia’s guns-at-work law.  
 189. One potential problem with this argument is that the wording of some of the exceptions 
suggests that they apply when federal law prevents an individual from possessing a firearm 
completely, not when federal law permits an individual to possess a firearm generally but prevents 
her from possessing the firearm in some contexts, such as in her vehicle at work. See, e.g., KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (“A person, including but not limited to an employer, who owns, leases, 
or otherwise occupies real property may prevent a person who is prohibited by state or federal law 
from possessing a firearm or ammunition from possessing a firearm or ammunition on the 
property.”); see also supra note 180. One may argue that if the Kentucky legislature intended to 
provide exception where federal law only prohibited possession while on work property, it could 
have drafted the provision as follows: A person, including but not limited to an employer, who 
owns, leases, or otherwise occupies real property may prevent a person who is prohibited by state or 
federal law from possessing a firearm or ammunition on the property from possessing a firearm or 
ammunition on the property. This revised version is of course quite cumbersome, which may 
explain why the legislature did not draft it this way. Further, the language of the statute as currently 
drafted is broad enough (federal law prohibiting possession) to encompass federal law prohibiting 
possession in certain circumstances (e.g., while at work).  
 190. This observation of course does not eliminate a conflict with the states that do not have a 
federal-law exception in their guns-at-work laws: Kansas, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. See KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2008), held unconstitutional as 
applied to church parking lots, Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 206–10, 
213 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); OKLA . STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22 (West 2008). 
 191. See supra notes 188, 190.  See also supra note 148; infra app. A. 
 192. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1296, 1330, 1337-40 (N.D. 
Okla. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th 
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Retail Federation, Inc. v. Attorney General, the Northern District of 
Florida reached the opposite conclusion, finding the OSH Act does not 
preempt Florida’s law.193 The Florida court reached the correct 
conclusion.194  
1.  Oklahoma: ConocoPhillips v. Henry 
In ConocoPhillips, the Northern District of Oklahoma considered 
challenges to Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws and held the statutes 
preempted as in conflict with the OSH Act’s overarching purposes, 
codified in 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) and the general duty clause, codified in 29 
U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).195 The court explained that Oklahoma’s statutes thwart 
the overall purposes of the Act to reduce occupational safety and health 
hazards and to stimulate programs for safe and healthy working 
conditions.196 According to the court, OSHA has encouraged employers to 
enact policies to reduce workplace hazards, but Oklahoma’s guns-at-work 
laws prevent that.197 The court also found that the statutes “pose a material 
impediment to compliance with the [Act’s] general duty clause” by 
prohibiting employers’ chosen method of abatement of a potential 
workplace hazard.198 The court thus held that Oklahoma’s guns-at-work 
laws conflict with the OSH Act and are preempted.199 It enjoined the 
                                                                                                                     
Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). 
 193. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2008).  
 194. See infra Part V. 
 195. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1296, 1330, 1337–40. The court also considered 
whether the statutes constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property rights or an 
unconstitutional deprivation of a fundamental right and held they do not. See id. at 1296. For an 
analysis of this, see generally Steines, supra note 186, for an argument that parking-lot laws, like 
those at issue in ConocoPhillips, do not violate due process, but do constitute unconstitutional 
takings and are bad policy. 
 196. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
 197. See id. The court found § 1289.7a(B) further thwarts the OSH Act’s purposes by 
immunizing employers from civil liability for any occurrences resulting from weapons in vehicles, 
and this shields employers from OSH Act liability for gun-related injuries, which undermines the 
OSH Act’s purposes. See id. This proves too much. By enacting § 1289.7a(B), the Oklahoma 
legislature presumably did not intend that the federal government is restricted by Oklahoma state 
law and may not hold someone liable under federal law. Cf. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 
720, 733–35 (1982) (explaining that “the Court has never questioned the propriety of absolute 
federal immunity from state taxation” and noting that the principle purpose of immunity doctrine is 
to prevent clashing sovereigns by preventing states from laying demands directly on federal 
government); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976) (noting the seminal principle that the 
federal Constitution and federal laws control state constitution and laws and cannot be controlled by 
them; and explaining that state regulation of the federal government is permitted only where there is 
a clear congressional mandate). More likely, § 1289.7a(B) is intending to immunize individuals 
from state civil liability for complying with this state law.  
 198. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1330, 1337.  
 199. Id. at 1340. 
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statutes to the extent of this preemption.200  
The Tenth Circuit recently held that the Northern District of Oklahoma 
reached the wrong result in finding preemption.201 In reversing the district 
court, the Tenth Circuit first noted the absence of any specific OSHA 
standard on workplace violence.202 It explained that gun-related workplace 
violence is therefore not a “recognized hazard” for which an employer may 
be liable under the general duty clause.203 According to the Tenth Circuit, 
“OSHA is aware of the controversy surrounding firearms in the workplace 
and has consciously decided not to adopt a standard.”204 Thus, the court 
found no conflict preemption between the general duty clause of the OSH 
Act and Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.205 
It also found no conflict between Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws and 
the general purposes of the OSH Act.206 The court explained that the OSH 
Act is not a “‘general charter for courts to protect worker safety,’”207 thus 
burdening employers to anticipate civic disorder by employees is beyond 
the scope of the OSH Act’s general purpose.208 Where, as here, state laws 
do not conflict with an OSH Act standard, the court found them not 
preempted.209  
2.  Florida: Florida Retail Federation v. Attorney General 
In Florida Retail Federation, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida considered whether Florida’s guns-at-work 
law violates the OSH Act.210 Reaching a conclusion contrary to the 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Id.  This decision conflicts with a decision of the Northern District of Florida in Florida 
Retail Federation v. Attorney General. 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008). This Article argues 
that the Florida Retail Federation decision is correct while the ConocoPhillips decision is 
incorrect. See infra Part V. 
 201. See Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050, at *1, 5 (10th Cir. Feb. 
18, 2009). The Ramsey court cited Florida Retail Federation in its decision. See id.  
 202. Id. at *3. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at *3. 
 205. See id. at *3–5. 
 206. Id. at *5. 
 207. Id. (citing Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 
2008)).  
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. This conclusion is correct.  See infra Part V. 
 210. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. The court also considered whether the statute is 
unconstitutional because it compels property owners to make their property available for purposes 
that they do not support and because it draws irrational distinction between businesses that are and 
are not required to permit guns in parking lots. Id. The court decided the preemption issue on a 
motion for preliminary injunction, see id., but it converted this to a final judgment on the merits 
pursuant to the parties’ agreement, see Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (Fla. Retail II), 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 1301, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
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Northern District of Oklahoma, Chief Judge Robert L. Hinkle held that the 
Act does not preempt Florida’s law.211 The court rested its decision on two 
independent bases.212  
First, the court explained that because the Secretary of Labor has not 
promulgated any standards, § 18(a) clearly applies to permit the states to 
regulate, and it therefore forecloses preemption.213 Second, the court 
rejected the argument that the general duty clause requires preemption.214 I  
reasoned that to find that the general duty clause preempts state guns-at-
work laws requires finding that the general duty clause mandates banning 
guns from parking lots for safety and that employers would necessarily 
face liability if they did not ban guns.215 But, this is not the case: employers 
do not necessarily face liability under the general duty clause for failing to 
ban guns from parking lots; thus, the general duty clause does not require 
invalidating state guns-at-work laws that prevent employers from banning 
guns.216 For these reasons, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the 
OSH Act preempts Florida’s guns-at-work law.217   
V.  THE OSH ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE GUNS-AT-WORK 
LAWS 
This Part argues that the Northern District of Florida reached the 
correct conclusion: the OSH Act does not preempt state guns-at-work laws. 
It first examines whether either of the OSH Act savings clauses save these 
laws from preemption and argues that § 18(a) should. It next maintains that 
even if neither savings clause saves these laws, they are still not preempted 
because neither express nor implied preemption exists. Courts therefore 
should not displace state guns-at-work laws. 
A.  Do the OSH Act Savings Clauses Save these Laws? 
This Section examines whether either of the OSH Act’s two savings 
clauses saves state guns-at-work laws from preemption. It concludes that 
while § 4(b)(4) does not, § 18(a) should be read to save guns-at-work laws 
from OSH Act preemption. 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. Because the general duty clause likely does not require employers to ban guns 
from vehicles, it seems unlikely Florida Statute § 790.251(7)(g), which creates an exception where 
firearm possession is prohibited pursuant to federal law, will enable employers to use the OSH Act 
to avoid complying with Florida’s guns-at-work law. See supra note 148. If, however, the general 
duty clause required banning guns from parking lots, then the OSH Act might excuse compliance. 
See supra note 148.  Either scenario prevents a conflict with the OSH Act.  
 217. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1299–1300.  
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1.  Section 4(b)(4) Likely Does Not Save These Laws 
The plain language of § 4(b)(4) suggests that it will not save guns-at-
work laws.218 The first half of § 4(b)(4) (everything before the “or”)219 is 
referred to here as the “workmen’s compensation clause,” and the 
remainder is simply known as “remainder clause.”220 
The workmen’s compensation clause is limited to only workmen’s 
compensation laws and is therefore easily eliminated as a vehicle to save 
state guns-at-work laws, which are not workmen’s compensation laws.221 
The remainder clause is also inapplicable because it applies only to laws 
“with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees.”222 Guns-at-work 
laws govern the storage of guns in vehicles,223 and not injuries, diseases, or 
death of employees.224  
2.  Section 18(a) Should Save These Laws 
Unlike § 4(b)(4), § 18(a) should save these laws. Section 18(a) 
expressly permits states to assert jurisdiction under state law over any 
occupational safety or health issue where no federal standard is in effect.225 
This section unequivocally expresses Congress’ intent not to preempt state 
law absent a standard.226 Without a federal standard, states may govern.227 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 219. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 220. See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See supra Part IV. 
 224. Of course, one might counter that guns-at-work laws permit employees to have guns, and 
this fact may lead to injury or death of employees, and therefore such laws fall within the remainder 
clause. This stretches the language of the remainder clause too far, and no court appears to have 
accepted such an argument. Moreover, although § 4(b)(4) is broadly worded, it has been construed 
primarily to save only state tort laws and criminal laws. See supra Part III.C.1. Only some of the 
state guns-at-work laws are part of the states’ penal codes. Se  infra app. A. Those laws would still 
have trouble under § 4(b)(4) because they are not necessarily laws “with respect to injuries, 
diseases, or death.” 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). The same is true for guns-at-work laws that may be 
classified as tort laws. 
 In addition to tort and criminal laws, § 4(b)(4) has also been applied to save rights granted by 
statute. See Startz v. Tom Martin Constr. Co., 823 F. Supp. 501, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1993). But, this 
statutory right directly involved injury or death and so is distinguishable from guns-at-work laws. 
See id. at 502–03, 506 (finding plaintiff’s personal injury claim under Illinois statute was saved and 
therefore not preempted); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 444–45 (1977) (explaining that “existing state statutory and common-law 
remedies for actual injury and death remain unaffected” by the OSH Act). As mentioned, guns-at-
work laws are not laws “with respect to injuries, diseases, or death.” See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).  
 225. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).  
 226. See id. (“Nothing in this Act shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting 
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no 
standard is in effect under section [655 of this title].”). 
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Here, there is no federal standard governing the prevention of workplace 
violence relevant to guns-at-work laws.228 OSHA generally defers to state 
and local law enforcement to regulate workplace violence.229 Thus, the 
OSH Act plainly permits states to regulate.230 As the Northern District of 
Florida stated, § 18(a) could not be clearer and prevents preemption of 
guns-at-work laws. 231 To find otherwise ignores clear congressional intent.  
a.  The Express Intent of Congress Prevents Preemption 
The rule applicable to express preemption is instructive here.232 When 
Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, 
the court’s task is simply to give effect to that language.233 “Although this 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See id. 
 228. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127 (recognizing in a 
Standard Interpretation letter that no standards exist); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
&  HEALTH ADMIN ., Workplace Violence, OSHA Standards, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplace 
violence/standards.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (stating that as of February 28, 2009, no 
standards exist for workplace violence); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH 
ADMIN ., Safety & Health Topics, Workplace Violence, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviol 
ence/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (stating OSHA is not initiating rulemaking on 
workplace violence at this time); see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 
1339 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (noting there are no specific “standards” governing workplace violence), 
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 
2009). 
 Moreover, the general duty clause is not a “standard.” See, e.g., Wilcox v. Niagara of Wis. 
Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 366 n.* (7th Cir. 1992) (Cummings, J., concurring) (maintaining that 
the Seventh Circuit has never held the general duty clause is a “standard” that preempts state law 
and contending such a finding “would be extremely ill-advised” as it “would imperil numerous 
traditional areas of state general health and safety regulation and would seem to subvert 29 U.S.C. 
§ 667(a)”); Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 15–17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding no 
“standard” governed where employer was cited for violation of general duty clause); Traudt v. 
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326, 1332 (D.C. 1997) (stating general duty clause is not a 
“standard” promulgated by rule under § 655, and the OSH Act preemption subsections only apply 
to federal standards promulgated by rule under that section); see also P & Z Co., Inc. v. District of 
Columbia, 408 A.2d 1249, 1250 (D.C. 1979) (explaining “standard” is a term of art, and the OSH 
Act preemption sections apply only to standards promulgated under § 655). 
 It is important to distinguish between federal standards that fall within § 18 and other federal 
regulations that may be relevant to issues of workplace violence. The former are limited to 
standards in effect per § 655 of Title 29 of the United States Code. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b). A 
federal regulation not promulgated under § 655 may relate to guns on workplace property, see, e.g., 
39 C.F.R. § 232.1(l) (2009) (“[N]o person while on postal property may carry firearms . . . or store 
the same on postal property, except for official purposes.”), but it does not fall within § 18(a), see 
29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b). 
 229. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127.  
 230. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
 231. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 232. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 841 (N.D. 2006) 
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990)). 
 233. Id. 
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rule is ordinarily applied in situations where Congress has expressly 
declared that certain state laws are preempted, [there is] no reason why it 
does not apply with equal force when Congress clearly and unambiguously 
states that certain state laws are not preempted by the federal act.”234 In 
both, “the intent of Congress is clear from the statutory language, and the 
court's ‘easy’ and solitary task is to enforce the statute according to its 
terms.”235  
The same rationale applies here. Congress has included a clause 
expressly stating that nothing in the OSH Act prevents states from 
regulating where no federal standard is in place.236 Indeed, no federal 
standard is in place.237 The express language of the Act prevents courts 
from finding guns-at-work laws preempted in conflict with the general 
duty clause or any other part of the OSH Act.238  
If the federal government wants exclusivity over the guns-in-vehicles-
at-work issue, it must first promulgate standards. In the absence of 
standards, the express text of the Act provides that states control.239 
Despite these arguments, the Northern District of Oklahoma (despite 
acknowledging § 18(a)) held that the OSH Act impliedly preempts 
Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.240 The court found Oklahoma’s guns-at-
                                                                                                                     
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. 
 236. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
 237. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 238. There is admittedly an issue with this argument. Geier seems to suggest that a court 
should only refrain from performing implied conflict preemption if the savings clause states 
something like “implied conflict preemption analysis is not permitted.” See Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). The Court seems to be suggesting that Congress can save 
state law from express preemption through a savings clause, but it may not save state law from 
implied preemption unless the savings clause declares this expressly. See id. at 867–74; see also 
Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (explaining that a 
savings clause merely limits the scope of express preemption but does not prevent conflict 
preemption and citing Geier). 
 One might therefore argue that because § 18(a) contains no such language, state guns-at-work 
laws may be preempted as in conflict with the OSH Act. As discussed further in Part V.A.2.b, 
applying such a broad reading of Geier should be rejected here in light of the clear language of 
§ 18(a) that can only mean states may govern in the absence of federal standards. Further, applying 
Geier that broadly is undesirable since doing so undermines the clear efforts of Congress, which 
may not realize its seemingly clear directive in § 18(a) needs altering to prevent all preemption. See 
Stone ex rel. Estate of Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(“The sweep of the Supreme Court’s implied preemption doctrine is of particular concern to 
Congress because Congress’ focus is necessarily on the issue sought to be remedied by a pending 
bill, not on the unintended consequences for existing state and federal legislation. Indeed, even 
express Congressional disclaimers of preemptive effect have proven ineffective in light of this 
jurisprudence.”). 
 239. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
 240. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1325–30 (N.D. Okla. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 
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work laws create an obstacle to the fulfillment of the OSH Act’s general 
purposes and its general duty clause.241 The court explained that 
Oklahoma’s laws prevent an employer from using one of its chosen 
methods to create a safe work environment, and thus conflict with the OSH 
Act and are therefore preempted by it.242  
Though the Oklahoma court addressed § 18(a), its treatment leaves 
much to be desired. The court discussed the negative implications of 
§ 18(a), but it failed to grapple with the positive implications of § 18(a), 
i.e. the effect of its express language.243 Instead, the court erroneously 
reasoned that because the alleged conflict between the state law and the 
OSH Act does not concern OSH Act “standards,” § 18(a) does not even 
apply.244 The court missed the point that § 18(a) clearly permits states to 
regulate in the absence of standards, and so they should be free to regulate 
here.245 
Preempting state law where § 18(a) expressly aves state law because 
other portions of the OSH Act (such as the general duty clause or the 
general purposes provision) impliedly conflict with that state law makes 
little sense. In doing so, the express text of the statute—§ 18(a)—is 
completely ignored in favor of implied preemption. 
Though this reading ignores the plain meaning of § 18(a), it is not 
wholly irrational in light of a non-OSH Act case, Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co., in which the Supreme Court held that though a savings clause 
may save state law from express preemption, it may not save it from 
implied preemption.246 As shown in the next Section, however, Geier 
should not override § 18(a). 
b.  Geier Should Not Bar the Plain Meaning of § 18(a) 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether § 18(a) prevents 
preemption here.247 But the Supreme Court’s opinion in Geier v. American 
                                                                                                                     
2009). The court relied in part on Geier’s progeny in which the Supreme Court noted that an 
express preemption clause does not bar the ordinary workings of implied conflict preemption. See 
id. at 1327 (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (citing Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)). 
 241. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1337–38.  
 242. Id.  
 243. See id. at 1325–27.  
 244. See id. at 1326–27.  
 245. See id. at 1325–30. 
 246. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (citing Freightliner Corp. 
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).   
 247. In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, he Court considered 
whether the OSH Act preempted state law and held it impliedly did. Ga e, 505 U.S. at 108–09. 
Gade is distinguishable because there w re federal standards on point, thus § 18(a) did not apply. 
See 29 U.S.C. 667(a) (2006); Gade, 505 U.S. at 92–93, 98–100. Here there are no such standards. 
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Honda Motor Co., a case involving a different federal law, suggests that 
the Court may not agree that § 18(a) unequivocally saves state guns-at-
work laws.248 In Geier, the Court held that a “saving clause (like [an] 
                                                                                                                     
See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869–74 (explaining that preemption provision in federal statute 
does not, by itself, foreclose through negative implication conflict preemption, and holding savings 
clause does not either). According to Geier, a savings clause may support a narrow reading of an 
express preemption clause, but this does not affect implied preemption. See id. at 868–74. As the 
Court explained, neither the savings clause, express preemption clause, nor both together create a 
special burden against implied preemption. Id. at 870–74. A broad savings clause does mean, 
however, a court should not “hunt for a conflict” between state and federal law. See In re Welding 
Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 688–89 (N.D. Ohio 2005). A conflict must be 
“‘direct, clear and substantial.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 107). 
 Prior to Geier, the Court reached a similar conclusion regarding federal law that contained an 
express preemption provision that did not preempt the state law at issue. See Freightliner, 514 U.S. 
at 287–89 (rejecting argument that Court need not consider implied preemption because federal law 
contains express preemption clause that does not apply). In Freightliner, respondent and the Court 
of Appeals maintained that because the federal law contained an express preemption provision, the 
scope of preemption was limited to the scope of the express preemption clause, and implied conflict 
preemption could not exist because the federal law contained an express preemption provision. Id. 
at 287. The Court rejected this claim and explained that implied preemption is still possible despite 
an express preemption clause that does not apply. See id. at 287–89. But see Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–17 (1992) (finding preemptive scope entirely governed by express 
preemption clause and implied preemption inapplicable). For a thorough discussion of the Court’s 
retreat from the position taken in Cipollone, see Ausness, upra note 43, at 940–71, which traces 
the Court’s post-Cipollone jurisprudence in which it has generally applied implied preemption 
despite an express preemption clause and arguing that the Court should return to its Cip llone 
position and decline to preempt state law on implied grounds where express preemption clause 
exists. The Court’s current position has been criticized as opening the door to preempting numerous 
cases not before considered appropriately preempted. S e Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of 
Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 828–29 (2007). 
 Despite such criticisms, the Court has continued to adhere to this position. See Sprietsma v. 
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (“Congress’ inclusion of an express pre-emption clause 
‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles’ . . . .” (citing Geier, 529 U.S. 
at 869)); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (rejecting argument 
that Court should be reluctant to find conflict preemption because of express preemption provision 
and reiterating that neither express preemption provision nor savings clause prevent implied 
preemption); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387–88 (2000) (“[T]he 
existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express 
congressional recognition that federal and state law may conflict.”).  
 Lower courts have recognized that this is the Supreme Court’s position where express 
preemption provisions and savings clauses are concerned. Se , e.g., James v. Mazda Motor Corp., 
222 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining Geier made clear courts should apply normal, 
implied preemption principles despite savings clause); In re Welding, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 678–79 
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (“Thus, even when Congress states expressly what aspects of state law it means 
to pre-empt, courts must still infer pre-emption beyond the confines of Congress's statements if state 
law actually conflicts with federal law.”); Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co, 877 A.2d 1247, 
1250–53 (N.J. 2005) (per curiam) (acknowledging savings clause but finding OSHA preempts state 
tort action because of conflict). But see Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 209–10 (3d Cir. 
2007) (distinguishing Geier and finding it does not compel conclusion that savings clause cannot 
foreclose further preemption analysis).  
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express pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of 
conflict pre-emption principles.”249 The Supreme Court has found that 
§ 18(a) is a savings clause.250 Therefore, even the plain text of § 18(a) may 
not prevent conflict preemption.251 But Geier should not be extended to 
apply here.252 It did not involve the OSH Act.253 It concerned a different 
law, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 
(NTMVSA),254 which does not contain the same clear, congressional 
directive embodied in § 18(a).255  
The NTMVSA savings clause states that compliance with a federal 
safety standard does not exempt any person from liability under common 
law.256 The Court held that the savings clause did not prevent conflict 
preemption of tort claims that conflict with the NTMVSA federal safety 
standards.257 The Court explained that nothing in the text of that savings 
clause evinced Congress intent to save state tort actions that conflict with 
                                                                                                                     
 249. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. 
 250. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100. 
 251. That this argument is even tenable reveals a major problem with the Court’s current 
conflict preemption jurisprudence: attempting to uncover Congress’ intent, the Court permits 
displacing Congress’s express statements of intent for the implied intent the Court discovers. 
 252. See, e.g., Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049–50 (D. 
Ariz. 2008) (rejecting argument that Geier helps establish universal rule that savings clauses must 
be minimized no matter the effect on or magnitude of the state police powers at issue); Levine v. 
Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 193–94 (Vt. 2006) (explaining that Geier “simply stands for the proposition 
that Congress’ intent not to preempt a provision of state law cannot be inferred from either (1) an 
express preemption clause that does not include the state law in question in its scope, or (2) a clause 
that prevents regulated entities from using compliance with federal law as a defense in state 
common-law suits,” but it does not permit preemption of state laws that have been expressly saved 
by Congress), aff’d, No. 06-1249, 2009 WL 529172 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009). 
 At least one court has agreed that Geier does not apply to one of the OSH Act savings clauses, 
§ 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). See Lindsey, 480 F.3d at 210 (distinguishing Geier and finding 
“[it] does not compel a conclusion that the savings clause in this case cannot foreclose further 
preemption analysis”). 
 253. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 864.  
 254. Id. The NTMVSA contains two relevant provisions: a preemption provision and a savings 
clause. See id. at 867–68. The preemption provision provides that whenever a federal motor vehicle 
safety standard is in effect, no state may establish or continue a state standard that is not identical. 
Id. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988)). The Court held that the preemption provision did 
not preempt the tort claims at issue. Id. at 868. 
 255. Courts routinely struggle with the question of the preemptive effect of Congressional 
statutes. See, e.g., E. Farish Percy, Applying the Common Fund Doctrine to an ERISA-Governed 
Benefit Plan’s Claim for Subrogation or Reimbursement, 61 FLA. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009) (noting 
varying decisions on whether ERISA preempts state-law actions for reimbursement or subrogation, 
or state common fund doctrines); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process  in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. 
REV. 185, 194 n.41 (2006) (discussing preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act). 
 256. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)). 
 257. See id. at 867–70. 
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federal regulations.258 Rather, the court found that the savings clause 
merely bars a certain kind of defense in those actions: that compliance with 
a federal standard automatically exempts defendants from state law 
whether Congress intended the federal standard to be an absolute 
requirement or only a minimal one.259  
The OSH Act savings clause is very different. It clearly states that 
nothing in the Act prevents states from regulating where no federal 
standard is in place.260 Unlike the NTMVSA savings clause, which does 
not unequivocally eliminate conflict preemption, § 18(a) plainly does. The 
plain language of § 18(a) necessarily means there can be no conflict where 
no federal standard is in place. Where no federal standard is in place, 
Congress has clearly ceded regulatory power to the states.  
Applying Geier despite § 18(a)’s clear directive suggests that the only 
way Congress may effectively “save” state law from all preemption—
including implied conflict preemption—is to include an explicit directive 
that implied preemption shall not apply. But this conclusion makes little 
sense. Through § 18(a), Congress has expressed its position on the balance 
of state-federal sovereignty:261 in the absence of a standard, state law 
controls worker health and safety. 
Courts should not search for an “implied” conflict with the express text 
of the OSH Act.262 If any conflict exists, it is with § 18(a), not state law. 
Where an act’s savings clause expressly permits state action, there can be 





                                                                                                                     
 258. See id. at 869. 
 259. See id.  
 260. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006). 
 261. See id.  
 262. See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828, 840–41 (N.D. 2006). 
 263. See id. (distinguishing Geier and its progeny because they do not involve express 
provisions explicitly providing that nothing in the federal statute shall preempt state law, and 
holding that where Congress has included an express provision granting states power to enact laws, 
it cannot frustrate the purposes of Congress when states act pursuant to that grant); cf. Jeffers v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 623 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (analyzing Geier and 
explaining that though the limited express preemption provision at issue does not foreclose conflict 
preemption, it cannot be ignored, and finding conflict preemption does not apply because the goals 
and purposes of the federal act in combination with the express preemption provision suggest 
Congress did not intend to preempt more). In reaching this conclusion, the Jeffers court highlights 
that the federal law contemplates a partnership in which the states retain their traditional powers, 
and it points to a statutory provision expressly permiting states to regulate. See id. at 624–25. OSH 
Act § 18(a) similarly provides a partnership permitting states to regulate. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).  
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B.  No Express Preemption 
No OSH Act provision expressly preempts guns-at-work laws.264 
Indeed, as discussed in Part IV, the majority of guns-at-work laws 
automatically yield to federal law according to their express terms. Express 
preemption is entirely absent. So too is implied preemption. 
C.  No Implied Preemption 
Courts are generally reluctant to infer preemption,265 and this reluctance 
may be even stronger with the OSH Act.266 The Act’s language and history 
suggest that “[it] should be interpreted in a manner that prevents the 
interference with states’ exercise of police powers to protect their 
citizens.”267 Guns-at-work laws are exercises of police power that should 
not be disturbed absent a clear conflict with federal law. No such conflict 
exists. 
1.  No Field Preemption 
Section 18 confirms that Congress did not intend the federal 
government exclusively regulate the entire field of worker-safety 
regulation.268 It expressly permits states to regulate where no federal 
standard exists.269 Because the OSH Act permits states to regulate in the 
                                                                                                                     
 264. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–700.  
 265. See Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); see also Eileen Silverstein, 
Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1991) (analyzing OSH Act and 
maintaining “the growing body of case law shows little tolerance for elaborate arguments in favor 
of broad federal preemption”). 
 266. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 53 n.6 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We would be very 
reluctant to infer preemptive intent absent some indication that the state law could have a 
significant adverse regulatory impact on OSHA’s mission in the workplace.”); s e also Wilcox v. 
Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 366 n.* (7th Cir. 1992) (Cummings, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Seventh Circuit has not held that the general duty clause is a standard that 
preempts state law, and such a decision “would be extremely ill-advised” as it “would imperil 
numerous traditional areas of state general health and safety regulation and would seem to subvert 
29 U.S.C. § 667(a)”).  
 267. Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fernandez, supra 
note 111, at 114). 
 268. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)–(b); Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 
1984). At least one court has interpreted § 18 to mean that “preemption under OSHA arises only 
where a state law or regulation concerns an occupational safety and health matter governed by a 
specific federal standard and only where an approved state plan is not in effect.” Lepore v. Nat’l 
Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296, 1306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff’d 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J. 
1989) (emphasis added).  
 269. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (permitting states to regulate in the absence of federal standards); 
see also Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 474 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting OSH Act 
expressly permits state regulation in occupational safety field of law).  
 Where a federal standard is in place for a specific issue, that standard preempts the field for that 
issue unless the state has a pre-approved plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b); Indus. Truck Ass’n v. 
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field of worker health and safety, field preemption is absent.270 Field 
preemption occurs only where the field is reserved for federal regulation, 
and Congress has left no room for state regulation.271 This is clearly not the 
case with the OSH Act,272 which embodies a system of cooperative 
federalism.273 
2.  No Conflict Preemption 
Even absent field preemption, the OSH Act may impliedly preempt 
state guns-at-work laws if they conflict with the OSH Act.274 But no 
conflict exists.275 
a.  No Impossibility Conflict Preemption  
Impossibility conflict preemption occurs where the federal and state 
statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict,” imposing directly conflicting duties 
with impossibility of dual compliance—“as they would, for example, if the 
federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’ while the state law said, ‘you 
                                                                                                                     
Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen OSHA promulgates a federal standard, 
that standard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state 
occupational safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are 
included in the state plan.”); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 104, 
n.2 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Although we have chosen to use the term ‘conflict’ pre-emption, 
we could as easily have stated that the promulgation of a federal safety and health standard ‘pre-
empts the field’ for any nonapproved state law regulating the same safety and health issue.”).  
 270. See Puffer’s, 742 F.2d at 16; see also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 
1282, 1302 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (finding field preemption absent), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, 
Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009); Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile 
Importing Co., 877 A.2d 1247, 1251 (N.J. 2005) (same). Congress has also made clear it does not 
intend to preempt the field where firearms are concerned. S e 18 U.S.C. § 927. 
 271. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002). “[F]ederal regulation of a field 
of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of 
persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other 
conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).  
 272. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (“Federal regulation of the workplace was not intended to be all 
encompassing, however.”); Schweiss, 922 F.2d at 474 (noting that OSH Act expressly permits state 
regulation in the occupational safety field of law); Puffer’s, 742 F.2d at 16 (“The express language 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act clearly indicates that in the absence of an applicable 
standard Congress did not intend that OSHA occupy an entire field of regulation, thereby ousting 
any state regulation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Berardi v. Getty 
Ref. & Mktg., Co., 435 N.Y.S.2d 212, 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Silverstein, supra note 267, at 39. 
 273. See supra Part III.B. 
 274. See supra Part II.B.2. See also ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 
1330–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (finding Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws impliedly preempted as in 
conflict with the OSH Act), rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 
388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).  
 275. Because there are no federal standards in place, Gade does not require finding 
preemption. See supra note 247; see also supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text; 
ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1326–27 (finding Gade conflict preemption lacking). 
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may not.’”276 The OSH Act does not expressly require something that 
guns-at-work laws prohibit or vice versa, nor is it physically impossible to 
comply with both.277 The OSH Act merely mandates that employers 
provide a work environment free from recognized hazards,278 while guns-
at-work laws require that employers may not prohibit individuals from 
storing guns in vehicles.279 The OSH Act does not expressly prevent 
locking guns in vehicles, nor has OSHA clarified that storing guns in 
vehicles is a recognized hazard that necessarily threatens employee health 
and safety.280 Employers can still provide a safe environment while 
permitting employees to store their guns in their vehicles.281 Impossibility 
conflict preemption does not exist.282  
b.  No Obstacle Conflict Preemption 
State guns-at-work laws are therefore only preempted if they frustrate 
the purposes of the federal law283 and are so inconsistent that they must 
yield.284 The test is whether the state law creates an obstacle to 
accomplishing Congress’s full purposes and objectives.285 The state law 
must be a “material impediment to the federal action, or ‘thwart[] the 
federal policy in a material way.’”286 No rigid formula exists: evaluation is 
                                                                                                                     
 276. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); see also Fla. Lime & Avocado 
Growers, 373 U.S. at 143.  
 277. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.  
 278. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006). 
 279. See supra Part IV. 
 280. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. Indeed, OSHA has suggested the contrary. 
See infra notes 324–31 and accompanying text. 
 281. See infra Part V.C.2.b.i. 
 282. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 (finding Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws do 
not create impossibility conflict preemption with the OSH Act); f. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding no impossibility 
conflict preemption because it was not physically impossible to comply with both state and federal 
law). 
 283. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78–79 (1987) (explaining that 
absent express preemption, preemption occurs only where compliance with both laws is a physical 
impossibility or where compliance with state law frustrates the purposes of the federal law, and 
finding because it is possible to comply with both, preemption only exists if state law frustrates 
federal purposes). 
 284. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977). 
 285. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Mgmt. Ass’n for Private 
Photogrammetric Surveyors v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603–04 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“In 
other words, in obstacle preemption cases federal law does not completely occupy a field of law, 
nor does state law require an act that federal law forbids (or vice-versa), but state law instead 
impedes some policy or purpose of a federal statute or regulation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 286. See Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 489 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Blue Circle Cement v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1509 
(10th Cir. 1994)). 
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case-by-case287 and considers the relationship between the state and federal 
laws as written, interpreted, and applied.288  
There is no basis to conclude that guns-at-work laws create an obstacle 
to and conflict with the OSH Act. The Northern District of Oklahoma 
found a conflict with the Act’s purposes and general duty clause, but the 
court based this on the assumption that guns-at-work laws decrease 
employee safety.289 As shown by the data, this assumption is not 
necessarily true.290  
i.  Guns-at-Work Laws Do Not Conflict with the General 
Purpose of the OSH Act 
The general purpose of the OSH Act is to enhance worker safety.291 
Guns-at-work laws do not threaten this objective. This is because 
“workplace homicides are not the result of disgruntled workers who take 
out their frustrations on coworkers or supervisors . . . rather, they are 
mostly robbery-related crimes.”292  
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
the federal agency responsible for recommending ways to prevent work-
related injuries,293 the “vast majority of workplace homicides” involve 
                                                                                                                     
 287. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
 288. Jones, 420 U.S. at 526 (finding state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the full 
objectives of Congress in enacting federal act where congressional goal is to facilitate value 
comparisons among similar products, and state law would effectively prevent any meaningful 
comparison). 
 289. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp.2d 1282, 1334–40 (N.D. Okla. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 
2009). It was also based on the court’s assumption that because guns-at-work laws prevent 
employers’ “chosen” method of enhancing safety (preventing guns in vehicles), they necessarily 
impede the objectives and duties of the OSH Act to enhance safety. Se  id. at 1336–39. Employers 
can still comply with the general duty clause and general purposes though their “chosen” method 
may be eliminated by state law. That an employer’s choices are restricted is no basis to displace 
state law. 
 290. See infra Part V.C.2.b.i. 
 291. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006). 
 292. See NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH &  HUMAN 
SERVS., Violence in the Workplace, Homicide in the Workplace, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violh 
omi.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). Data on homicides is used because it is the most readily 
accessible. Indeed, when OSHA has considered the issue of guns at work and workplace violence, it 
too has focused on workplace homicides. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, 
supra note 127. Further, though there are undoubtedly cases of workplace violence that did not 
result in death, when eliminating all cases not involving guns and focusing only on gun cases (the 
only cases relevant to this Article), it is doubtful that the rationale applying to homicides does not 
apply to these cases simply because the gun that was used did not result in death.  
 293. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH &  HUMAN SERVS., 
FACT SHEET 1, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/2003-116.pdf. 
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perpetrators with no legitimate relationship to the business.294 Employer 
policies prohibiting employees from locking weapons in cars do not even 
apply to these individuals.  
Unlike random criminals, employees are more likely to follow 
employer anti-weapon policies, but worker-on-worker fatalities (where the 
perpetrator is a present or past employee) account for a small percentage of 
workplace homicides—only 7%.295 Employer policies prohibiting or 
permitting guns in vehicles would not affect the portion of these homicides 
committed by past employees because past employees are no longer bound 
by such policies. Current employees are of course bound, but they also can 
be required to attend employer-sponsored training, which is critical to 
prevent worker-on-worker violence.296 
Moreover, individuals with extensive criminal records generally 
commit more murders than ordinary people with access to weapons.297 
Individuals undeterred by moral obligation or criminal laws are hardly 
likely to heed employer policies preventing them from storing guns in 
vehicles. Because those most likely to threaten worker safety with guns are 
least likely to follow policies prohibiting guns in vehicles, eliminating the 
policies will not necessarily decrease safety.  
Further, there is evidence to suggest that gun ownership actually 
correlates with increased safety.298 One commentator maintains that public 
gun access is a deterrent to crime.299 Criminals who know potential victims 
have access to weapons are less likely to commit crimes that bring them in 
                                                                                                                     
 294. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH &  HUMAN SERVS., 
WORKPLACE V IOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND RESEARCH NEEDS 4, http://www.cdc.gov/nio 
sh/docs/2006-144/pdfs/2006-144.pdf. The crimes involved may include robbery, shoplifting, 
trespass, and terrorism. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 17–18.  
 297. Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?: A 
Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 649, 665–70 
(2007). 
 298. See id. at 653, 673 (“[T]he available international data cannot be squared with the mantra 
that more guns equal more death and fewer guns equal less death. Rather, if firearms availability 
does matter, the data consistently show that the way it matters is that more guns equal less violent 
crime.”). According to Kates and Mauser, “adoption of state laws permitting millions of qualified 
citizens to carry guns has not resulted in more murder or violent crime in these states. Rather, 
adoption of these statutes has been followed by ver  significant reductions in murder and violence 
in these states.” Id. at 659 (emphasis added); see also John R. Lott, Jr., Does Allowing Law-Abiding 
Citizens to Carry Concealed Handguns Save Lives?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 355, 358–61 (1997) 
(conducting research and finding that permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons creates 
deterrent effect for criminals, reducing murders by 8%, rapes by 5%, aggravated assaults by 7%, 
and robbery by 3%). 
 299. See Lott, Jr., supra note 298, at 359–60. 
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contact with potentially armed victims.300 Even individuals without guns 
benefit from this deterrence effect.301 
Of course, this is correlation not causation, but it undermines the 
argument that accessibility to guns necessarily decreases safety. Guns-at-
work laws arguably protect workers by enabling them to keep their 
firearms nearby for self-defense and by deterring criminals who recognize 
that workers may have easily accessible means of protection. 
The other side to this debate highlights many instances where guns 
have escalated dangerous situations into deadly tragedies.302 This valid 
position must not be ignored. This Article does not maintain that guns-at-
work laws are a good idea or even that they necessarily increase safety by 
arming the “proper” parties. It merely shows that the OSH Act’s general 
purpose of worker safety cannot be used to defeat guns-at-work laws 
because such laws do not necessarily obstruct that purpose and indeed may 
actually further it. At best, the evidence is indeterminate and points in 
either direction. A court therefore should not find that guns-at-work laws 
conflict with the general purposes of the OSH Act.  
Finding a conflict between guns-at-work laws and the OSH Act’s 
general purposes is based on speculation, and such reasoning is 
impermissible. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, a hypothetical or 
speculative conflict is insufficient for preemption: conflict should not be 
created where none actually exists.303  
To determine whether an actual conflict exists, courts look for “‘special 
features warranting pre-emption.’”304 These include the dominance of the 
federal interest in the area, such as in foreign affairs, which militates in 
favor of preemption.305 Areas such as health and safety, which states have 
                                                                                                                     
 300. Id. at 360. 
 301. Id.  
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 8–11. 
 303. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (rejecting argument that actions will  
occur that will  create conflict as too speculative for preemption); Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 720 (1985) (finding argument that county ordinance is 
an obstacle to federal goal is “too speculative to support pre-emption”); Exxon Corp. v. Governor 
of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130–31 (1978) (finding the existence of potential conflicts too speculative to 
warrant preemption); see also Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 475–76 (8th Cir. 
1990) (rejecting argument that state law frustrates congressional purpose and is preempted because 
lack of evidence renders argument speculative). Even if there is an actual conflict, state law is 
displaced only to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. See Dalton v. Little Rock Family 
Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996). 
 304. English, 496 U.S. at 87 (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719). 
 305. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719. For instance, where a federal law governing 
foreign relations invests the President with a plentitude of authority, and state law would impose 
different pressure, the state law creates a conflict compromising the President’s ability to speak with 
one voice in foreign affairs. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375–77, 
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traditionally regulated, disfavor preemption.306 
Because guns-at-work laws regulate health and safety, courts must 
pause before displacing these state laws. During this pause, courts should 
notice that neither the OSH Act, nor OSHA, nor the Secretary of Labor has 
decreed that storing guns in vehicles threatens worker safety—quite the 
contrary307—and there is evidence suggesting that guns may actually 
increase safety. 
ii.  Guns-at-Work Laws Do Not Conflict with the Act’s General 
Duty Clause 
The general duty clause requires employers to furnish employees a 
place of employment free from recognized hazards.308 These hazards 
traditionally arise from some condition inherent in the workplace 
environment.309 Though there may be circumstances where failing to 
protect employees from violence could be a general-duty-clause violation, 
the OSH Act is not typically enforced this way.310  
It is unlikely that employers would face general-duty-clause liability for 
random acts of violence that courts do not recognize as part of the nature 
of the specific business but rather as “random antisocial acts which may 
occur anywhere.”311 Surely, the general duty clause would not hold an 
employer liable when an employee inexplicably shoots a coworker for no 
apparent reason or where a minor argument that should normally lead to 
nothing more than hurt feelings turns deadly.  
Employers cannot prevent intentional, violent acts of employees.312 If 
                                                                                                                     
380–82, 388 (2000). Similarly, where Congress clearly intended to limit economic pressure on a 
foreign country, yet state law penalizes conduct Congress explicitly exempted, there is a conflict. 
See id. at 377–80. Crosby highlighted additional evidence supporting its conclusion that a conflict 
existed, including that in response to the passage of the state act, a number of United States allies 
filed formal protests; the European Union and Japan filed formal complaints against the U.S. with 
the World Trade Organization; and, the Executive consistently represented that the state act has 
complicated its dealing with foreign sovereigns. Id. at 382–84. Though the Court does not blindly 
defer to such opinions, it is competent and direct evidence of the state act’s frustration of 
congressional objectives. Id. at 385–86.  
 306. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719.  
 307. See supra note 228 and accompanying text, and i fra notes 324–31 and accompanying 
text. 
 308. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006). 
 309. See Megawest Fin., Inc., Dec. & Orders Occ. Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n No. 93-
2879, 1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *24 (May 8, 1995). 
 310. Efforts to Prevent Workplace Violence Slow in Coming from Federal OSHA Program, 23 
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 334 (Aug. 25, 1993). 
 311. Id.  
 312. An employer may, however, be held responsible for a negligent employee’s conduct if 
such conduct could have been prevented through feasible precautions such as proper training. See 
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an employee wants to commit a crime, he will likely find a way to do it. “A 
demented, suicidal, or willfully reckless employee may on occasion 
circumvent the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety 
regime,” but this is not within the purview of the employer’s general duty 
requirement.313 Employers are not necessarily responsible for the aberrant 
behavior of employees.314  
The OSH Act is concerned with increasing workplace safety, but 
random acts of violence are not workplace specific. They occur anywhere 
and everywhere, affecting society as a whole. Thus, society and its safety 
arm, the police, bear the burden of eliminating general violence, not 
employers.  
Nonetheless, OSHA advised in a letter of interpretation that the general 
duty clause may require an employer to take action to abate a risk of 
workplace violence.315 The Northern District of Oklahoma seized on this 
letter to support its conclusion that guns-at-work laws necessarily conflict 
with the general duty clause.316 In that letter, OSHA stated: 
In a workplace where the risk of violence and serious 
personal injury are significant enough to be “recognized 
hazards,” the general duty clause would require the employer 
to take feasible steps to minimize those risks. Failure of an 
employer to implement feasible means of abatement of these 
hazards could result in the finding of an OSH Act violation.  
On the other hand, the occurrence of acts of violence which 
are not “recognized” as characteristic of employment and 
represent random antisocial acts which may occur anywhere 
would not subject the employer to a citation for a violation of 
the OSH Act.317 
                                                                                                                     
Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660 F.2d 439, 
445–46 (10th Cir. 1981). But, the general duty clause is not intended to impose absolute liability 
nor hold an employer liable on a respondeat superior basis for employee negligence. Getty Oil Co. 
v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976).  
 313. See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 489 F.2d 
1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Megawest, 1995 OSAHRC LEXIS 80, at *26. 
 314. Nat’l Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265–66 & n.35. As the Fifth Circuit explained, the general 
duty clause is not intended to impose absolute liability nor hold an employer liable on a respondeat 
superior basis for an employee’s negligence. G tty Oil, 530 F.2d at 1145.  
 315. See Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, Occupational 
Safety and Health Admin., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/ 
owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=20951. 
 316. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1331–32 (N.D. Okla. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 
2009). 
 317. Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315 (emphasis added).  
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As OSHA also explained, whether an employer faces liability turns on 
the specific circumstances of the case.318 In workforces where the risk of 
violence is a “recognized hazard” in that industry, the general duty clause 
may require an employer to take feasible steps to minimize the risk; 
however, this requirement is industry-specific, and there is no evidence 
that minimizing risks requires banning guns from all parking lots in all 
workplaces everywhere.319  
Further, the letter suggests employers will not be liable for complying 
with state guns-at-work laws.320 This is because “the feasibility of the 
means of abatement [of the hazard is a] critical factor[] to be considered” 
for liability.321 Where state law prevents employers from banning guns 
from vehicles, employers may find other feasible alternatives to eliminate 
the hazard of guns in the workplace. For instance, employers could install 
metal detectors at office entrances or sponsor gun awareness programs to 
educate employees on the dangers of improper handgun usage.322  
Given the presence of other options, it seems unlikely that OSHA 
would hold employers liable because they decided, rather than banning 
guns in parking lots, to pursue alternative precautions of arguably equal 
efficacy. Because alternatives of arguably equivalent efficacy are available, 
state laws that prohibit guns in vehicles should not bar fulfillment of the 
general-duty-clause obligation to enhance worker safety. Guns-at-work 
laws may eliminate one possible way to enhance safety. But, eliminating 
one of many means should not obstruct accomplishing the ultimate goal.  
The general duty clause does not require banning guns from vehicles as 
the only means of ensuring worker safety.323 Employers may 
simultaneously ensure worker safety and permit guns in vehicles. Indeed, 
permitting guns in vehicles may actually assist employers in enhancing 
worker safety. Thus, state guns-at-work laws do not conflict with the 
                                                                                                                     
 318. Id. 
 319. See id.; see also Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127. 
 320. Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315. 
 321. Id.; see also Getty Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 530 F.2d 
1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting general duty clause requires employers to discover and exclude 
from workplace feasibly preventable hazards).  
 322. See, e.g., Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(“An employer must take reasonable precautionary steps to protect its employees from reasonably 
foreseeable recognized dangers that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
injury. And precautionary steps, of course, include the employer's providing an adequate safety and 
training program.”). 
 323. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1299 (N.D. Fla. 2008) 
(“If the failure to ban guns were indeed a violation of the general duty clause, then all businesses 
would have a duty to ban guns. One doubts that even the plaintiffs really assert this is the law; they 
at least have not done so explicitly in this case. This record makes clear that some businesses 
believe guns in parking lots are a danger and wish to ban them. But surely some businesses do not. 
By enacting the general duty clause, Congress did not weigh in on this issue.”). 
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general duty clause and thus should not be preempted by it. 
The Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA, Thomas Stohler, 
recently bolstered this position in a letter to then-state Representative Jerry 
Ellis, who principally authored Oklahoma’s guns-at-work laws.324 That 
letter states that OSHA does not believe that the OSH Act preempts 
Oklahoma’s law.325 According to Stohler, since no OSHA standard 
governs guns in vehicles, states retain broad authority in this arena.326 This 
further bolsters the conclusion that the OSH Act does not preempt state 
guns-at-work laws.327 
 
VI.   GUNS AT WORK: PREEMPTION REQUIRES A STANDARD 
Despite the OSH Act’s preference for occupational health and safety 
standards,328 OSHA has not adopted standards governing workplace 
violence329 even after specifically considering the issue—including a direct 
request to ban guns from the workplace—on multiple occasions.330 OSHA 
has strongly suggested that this silence is deliberate because a standard is 
not warranted.331 
Rather than adopt binding standards, OSHA has issued non-binding 
guidelines332 and letters of interpretation.333 To override state guns-at-work 
                                                                                                                     
 324. See 28(j) Notice of Supplemental Authority Doc. 01017579209, Letter from Thomas M. 
Stohler, Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, to 
Hon. Jerry Ellis (Jan. 16, 2009), Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-5166, 2009 WL 388050 
(10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009); see also Marie Price, OSHA: Federal act does not pre-empt Oklahoma 
gun law, THE JOURNAL RECORD, Jan. 21, 2009, at News.  
 325. See Letter from Thomas M. Stohler to Jerry Ellis, supra note 324. 
 326. See id. 
 327. Whether the federal agency that enforces the federal law believes preemption exists is 
important. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67–68 (2002); see also Hillsborough 
County, 471 U.S. at 721 (explaining where Congress has delegated to an agency administration of a 
federal program, and the agency has not suggested interference with federal goals, the Court is 
reluctant to find preemption). But see Geier, 529 U.S. at 884–85 (cautioning that no formal agency 
statement of preemptive intent is necessary before finding conflict preemption). 
 328. See supra Part III.A and notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
 329. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315; see also Letter from 
Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127. 
 331. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127. OSHA recently 
bolstered this conclusion. See supra notes 324–26 and accompanying text. 
 332. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, supra note 127; see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH ADMIN ., Workplace Violence, Possible 
Solutions, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/solutions.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2009); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &  HEALTH ADMIN ., ALL ABOUT OSHA 13 
(2006), http://www.osha.gov/Publications/all_about_OSHA.pdf (“Failure to implement a guideline 
is not itself a violation of the OSH Act’s general duty clause.”). 
 333. See Letter from Roger A. Clark to John R. Schuller, supra note 315; Letter from Richard 
E. Fairfax to Morgan Melekos, upra note 127.  
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laws without satisfying the process for promulgating standards undermines 
the OSH Act—and violates the express dictates of § 18(a). It also upsets 
the delicate balance of sovereignty the OSH Act provides for in this 
traditionally state-controlled arena. Preemption of guns-at-work laws 
therefore first requires the promulgation of standards. 
A.  The General Duty Clause Does Not Permit Circumventing 
Standards 
The general duty clause is intended to fill the gap for unrecognized 
hazards, not to circumvent standards.334 Permitting the general duty clause 
to circumvent standards subverts the OSH Act’s intricate procedure for 
promulgating standards, which provides informed decision-making and 
notice.335 This procedure enables interested parties to share information 
about a proposed rule’s potential effect and about whether the rule is likely 
to accomplish its objectives.336 This process and the resulting standards are 
preferred to the general duty clause because standards provide notice to 
parties who must follow the rules.337 This arrangement enables parties to 
govern their conduct on the front end, rather than face liability on the back 
end after unknowingly violating the amorphous general duty clause.  
B.  Standards Strike the Proper Balance of Cooperative 
Federalism 
Standards strike the proper balance of cooperative federalism embodied 
in the OSH Act. They do so by providing states with prior notice that 
applying state law to the workplace could violate the OSH Act in certain 
circumstances. For guns-at-work laws with exceptions for federal law,338 
standards make clear that these exceptions apply and the general laws 
should not be enforced against employers. For states without these 
exceptions,339 standards may signal a need to enact them. Many states have 
already enacted positive law that yields to federal supremacy.340  
The state statutory exceptions for federal law apply when federal law 
“prohibits” firearm possession.341 Absent a standard, the OSH Act does not 
                                                                                                                     
 334. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 335. See 29 U.S.C. § 655. 
 336. See id. § 655(b). 
 337. See id.  
 338. See supra Part IV.B; infra app. A. 
 339. See supra note 190; infra app. A. 
 340. See supra Parts IV.A., B.; infra app. A. 
 341. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251(7)(g) (West 2008) (excepting property upon which 
firearm possession is “prohibited” pursuant to federal law); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(6) 
(West 2008) (providing exception where transport of firearms on employers’ premises is 
“prohibited” by state or federal law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(2) (West 2008) (permitting a 
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appear to prohibit firearm possession in vehicles parked on employer 
property. OSHA has had multiple opportunities to promulgate a standard 
governing workplace safety.342 A continued failure to do so must be 
interpreted as an affirmative decision that regulation of guns in vehicles 
should be left to the states, even when those vehicles are at work.343 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 does not preempt state guns-at-work laws. Intense debate continues 
to rage over guns in America with the individual right to bear arms 
recently gaining constitutional moorings. Courts should not lightly cast 
aside state laws absent a standard decreeing guns in vehicles create a 
recognized hazard to workplaces. Absent this, states must be able to 
continue enacting laws governing the health, welfare, and safety of their 
citizens. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires nothing less. 
                                                                                                                     
person, including an employer, to prevent an individual from possessing a firearm on the property 
where that individual is “prohibited” by federal law from possessing a firearm); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 32:292.1(D)(1) (2008) (providing the section shall not apply to any property where 
possession of firearms is “prohibited” by state or federal law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(4) (West 
2008) (stating this section does not authorize a person to store a firearm on any premises where the 
possession of firearms is “prohibited” by federal law).  
 342. See supra notes 228, 324–31 and accompanying text. 
 343. OSHA has recently recognized this correct conclusion. See supra notes 324–26 and 
accompanying text. 
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Alaska None provided in the 
provision. 
Yes344 Yes No 
Florida Damages, injunctive 
relief, civil penalties, 
“other relief as may 
be appropriate,” “all 
reasonable personal 
costs and losses 
suffered,” court costs 
and attorney’s fees to 
prevailing party. Part 
of criminal code. 
Yes Yes No 
Georgia Action by Attorney 
General. Part of 
criminal code. 
Yes Yes No 
Kansas None provided in the 
provision. 
No No No 
                                                                                                                     
 344. But see supra note 180. 
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Kentucky Civil liability, 
injunction, 
“appropriate relief.” 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 527.020 is part of 
criminal code. 
Yes No No 
Louisiana Civil action for 
damages.345 
Yes Yes No 
Minnesota None provided in 
the provision, but 
statute is part of 
criminal code. 
No No No: 
Minn. Stat. 







Mississippi None provided in 
the provision. 









statutes are part of 
criminal code. 






                                                                                                                     
 345. Louisiana’s statute does not provide this expressly, but it necessarily stems from sections 
B and C. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1(B)–(C). 
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